

WARNING CONCERNING COPYRIGHT RESTRICTIONS:

The copyright law of the United States (Title 17, United States Code) governs the making of photocopies or other reproduction of copyrighted material

Under certain conditions specified in the law, libraries and other archives are authorized to furnish a photocopy or other reproduction. One of these specified conditions is that the photocopy or reproduction is not to be used for any purpose other than private study, scholarship, or research. If electronic transmission of reserve material is used for purposes in excess of what constitutes "fair use", that user may be liable for copyright infringement.

NATIONALISM & ETHNIC POLITICS

Volume 5 Autumn/Winter 1999 Numbers 3&4

Special Issue

Identity and Territorial Autonomy in Plural Societies

Editors

**William Safran
Ramón Máiz**

A Frank Cass Journal

ISSN 1353-7113

Internal Unit Demarcation and National Identity: India, Pakistan, and Sri Lanka	Swarna Rajagopalan	191
The Political Demands of Isolated Indian Bands in British Columbia	Dennis L. Thomson	212
Why Territorial Autonomy Is Not a Viable Option for Managing Ethnic Conflict in African Plural Societies	Shaheen Mozaffar and James R. Scarritt	230
Security in Deeply Divided Societies: The Role of Territorial Autonomy	Donald Rothchild and Caroline Hartzell	254
BOOK REVIEWS (see over)		272
Abstracts		284
Notes on Contributors		287
Volume Index		289

For details of past and future contents of this and our other journals
please visit our website at www.frankcass.com/jnls

- was hard to believe that while the rioters were shooting at him they fully expected him to fire back. Interview, July 1990.
55. *New York Times*, 7 Apr. 1981, p.A3.
 56. Ramet, pp.370–82.
 57. *Christian Science Monitor*, 2 Sept. 1981, p.7; *Dragnich and Todorovich*, p.172.
 58. *The Chicago Tribune*, 17 Oct. 1988; Associated Press, 25 Apr. 1987.
 59. Warren Zimmermann, *Origins of a Catastrophe* (New York: Times Books, 1996), p.80.
 60. Judah, pp.314–7.
 61. Romnews (The Roma National Congress), 18 June 1998.
 62. See William Drozdiak, 'Rise of Kosovo Guerrillas Puts NATO Powers in a Bind', *Washington Post*, 8 July 1998, p.A19.
 63. See Alan J. Kuperman, 'False Hope Abroad', *Washington Post*, 14 June 1998, p.CO1.
 64. Patrick Moore, 'More Attacks on Serbian Police', RFE/RFL, 5 Aug. 1997.
 65. This was a 20 May 20, 1998 e-mail message to the author from RFE/RFL editor Patrick Moore.
 66. See Judith Miller, 'When Sovereignty Isn't Sacrosanct', *New York Times*, 18 Apr. 1999; and Neil A. Lewis, 'The Rationale: A Word Bolsters Case For Allied Intervention', *New York Times*, 4 Apr. 1999.
 67. Arend Lijphart, *Democracy in Plural Societies: A Comparative Exploration* (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1977).
 68. See Timothy D. Sisk, *Power Sharing and International Mediation in Ethnic Conflicts* (Washington, DC: United States Institute of Peace Press, 1996), p.35.
 69. *Ibid*, p.35.
 70. Malcolm, *Kosovo: A Short History*.
 71. Noel Malcolm, 'Independence for Kosovo', *New York Times*, 9 June 1999.
 72. See Ruth Lapidoth, *Autonomy: Flexible Solutions to Ethnic Conflict* (Washington, DC: United States Institute of Peace Press, 1997), pp.41–7.
 73. Rilindja (Tirana), Rugova news conference, 30 Mar. 1996.
 74. See Fareed Zakaria, 'Illiberal Democracies', *Foreign Affairs*, Nov./Dec. 1997.
 75. 'Women Drowned in Skinhead Attack', *Associated Press*, 17 Feb. 1998. This report is representative of many reports of attacks on the Roma population in the Czech Republic.
 76. See Marco Dogo, 'Kosovo: Pleading in Defense of a Division', *ISIG*, Aug. 1998, pp.14–15; John L. Mearsheimer, 'A Peace Agreement That's Bound to Fail', *Washington Post*, 19 Oct. 1998; and John Mearsheimer and Stephen Van Evera, 'Redraw the Map, Stop the Killing', *New York Times*, 19 Apr. 1999.
 77. Lapidoth, p.39.
 78. See Anatol Lieven, 'What Role for Russia?', *New York Times*, 14 June 1999.
 79. Anthony Lewis, 'Proof of the Pudding', *New York Times*, 5 June 1999

Internal Unit Demarcation and National Identity: India, Pakistan and Sri Lanka

SWARNA RAJAGOPALAN

As the physical embodiment of the vision of the state,¹ territory is sacrosanct. When the state is described in the constitution, there is usually some indication of what regions it comprises. It is not just the list of included territories that is inviolate, but also their definition, their relation to one another and to the collective. In other words, territorial sanctity pertains to both the collective and the individual unit(s) of territory. Alterations in either alter the nature of the collective, and that threatens the survival of the state. Equally, however, the sense of identity of any group of people seems to be related to some portion of land, larger or smaller.

Territorial demarcation is a feature of modern nation-states. The dynastically-identified polities that preceded them had a core area, beyond which their decreasing control yielded at some point to another polity. People were known by many things – family, village, language, religion, or occupation, and of these only the village was spatially bound. Therefore, even a people with a distinct cultural identity and a long history, such as the three communities in this study, had no need to say 'This is where we end and someone else begins.'

One of the circumstances in which visions seek territorial manifestation is in response to the territorialization of an alternative vision. So those who were a people, unbounded by geographical limits, would claim a geographical space for themselves when they were confronted by another definition of their space. For instance, the literature and folklore of Tamils in India described their space vividly – from Tirupati to Kanyakumari. However, the modern territorial sense of a Tamil homeland came with the recognition of an Andhra province in the north-eastern part of Madras – a large colonial administrative unit. As linguistic minorities within Madras acquired their own areas, the need to have the remainder recognized as Tamil country was overwhelming. Likewise, in the case of Karachi, by searching for a territorial space for the *muhajireen* (those who migrated to

Pakistan during the 1947 Partition), the Pakistan government forced the Sindi to claim primacy and primary 'ownership' of Karachi. The creation of administrative units in the colonial period and then the conversion of those units into state and sub-state units provided the impetus for other collectivities in the polity to articulate their spaces. Sometimes, where the unit coincided broadly with the areas occupied by an ethnic group, the members of that group came to cast their past within the confines of that unit, claiming for the form of the unit a standing and legitimacy that antiquity alone lends. In Gaston Bachelard's words, 'An entire past comes to dwell in a new house.'²

The demarcation of units within a polity is often tantamount, if not to the throwing down of a gauntlet, then to the assertion of a particular dispensation or vision. As it pleases some, so must it displease others. Those displeased find it easiest to articulate their dissent or formulate their demands in territorial terms. Territorial demands also are a 'front' for other grievances. The territory claimed as homeland or nation represents a sanctuary from repression or a haven where, by definition, the group will thrive. Often, it is not the demand voiced most vociferously that is the concession or privilege sought. The land that is claimed in such cases is the 'motherland', the land that will nourish, as opposed to the territory of others who deprive and repress the group. The claim is sometimes extended to people who have never lived there and who would be hard-pressed to do so. Colombo Tamil claims to belong to Jaffna fall in this category. The claims are no less valid for being rhetorical since they are an instrument to draw attention to something that is not right.

If we accept this, then there is no question that the demarcation of units is a tangible, physical statement of the state or nation-state's self-image as well as its image of the 'place' of its units. For instance, the Indian Constituent Assembly's argument for calling India a 'union' (see below), or the view of India as people coming together to reorganize themselves as states (units within the whole), denies the units' history by saying that they did not exist before the constitution. At the same time, even though the constitution (i.e., the entity of India) did not exist before the people came together, it precedes the units in history. Thus, the whole appropriates to itself a history that it denies the units. When, as in the case of the Indian union, the union can create and alter the shape and form of the units more or less unilaterally, then the unit is totally dependent on the state for its present and future (having already been denied a past).

The question of unit demarcation within the state is thus a question prior to that of power distribution within the state. There are two parts to this question. First, states (framers of constitutions) must decide how many tiers the governmental structure shall have, and what the distribution of power

and 'lines of command' shall be. Second, and this is the crux of this paper, states must choose what the basis shall be whereby the primary unit of administration is demarcated. Is it to be language, geography, electoral considerations, or something else? Given that in most states, and in all of the three states that are studied in this project – India, Pakistan and Sri Lanka – the life and existence of the units is constitutionally derived from what Taussig calls the 'state of the whole',³ it is contended that the vision of the units is derivative of the vision of the state as a whole. Where the vision of the state is contested, the vision of the unit is apt to be contested. To achieve reconciliation in the polity, agents of the state and of civil society must, first, find a way to reconcile the competing and seemingly incompatible visions of what should constitute the unit.

There is more than one vision of the state and more than one vision of its parts. The state is not a unitary actor, and its agents, functionaries and interpreters speak in a multiplicity of voices and act on a myriad versions of the constitutional vision – which is in effect, if not in law, merely one among equals. The 'groups' or 'regions' are also not unitary actors. First of all, unlike the state whose territorial limits are hermetic enough that they simulate perfect definition, the borders/membership of other human collectives are/is still murky around the edges, and it is hard to say who belongs and who does not. Indeed, this definition forms the substance of politics within the collective.

Therefore, there are many visions of the 'state-of-the-whole' and many visions of the parts thereof. It is not a simple good-versus-evil, dark versus-light contest. These visions may be at odds with each other, and so may the visions of the parts. Any task of reconciliation involves some consensus-building across all these visions.

Each vision of the 'state-of-the-whole' gives rise to a predictable, consistent vision of the parts of that whole. Each vision of a part has a corollary vision of the 'state-of-the-whole.' For instance, to envision the Malaysian state as primarily a Malay state, is to predetermine what the place and role of other parts shall be. To envision the United States as an English-speaking state was until recently to create a rationale for learning English and assimilating non-English speaking immigrants. To envision Bangladesh as Bengali is to raise questions about the identity of the non-Bengalis and their *bona fides* as Bangladeshis. Conversely, for Québécois to define themselves as separate and distinct undermines the idea of Canada as a bilingual, bicultural state. For increasing numbers of Asian immigrants in the United Kingdom and North African immigrants in France to make their presence felt in the political process in the last two decades is to undermine respectively the primordial 'British' and 'French' nature of those states. For China's new region, Hong Kong, to assert its distinctive political and

economic, but also cultural characteristics, *vis-à-vis* the state-of-the-whole is to call into question the 'state-of-the-whole' itself.

This relationship is even stronger territorially. Kashmir is only the most contentious example in South Asia, symbolizing the founding argument for Pakistan and its Indian counter, and holding ransom in its valleys the legitimacy of both those state ideologies. In all the three states in this study, the vision of the state has led to certain internal dispensations which have been negotiated over the years. Pakistan was founded as the South Asian 'homeland' for Muslims, but when it became an 'Islamic Republic' one of the first experiments was 'One Unit' – which erased the more conventional demarcation of regions, particularly in west Pakistan and which therefore de-ethnicized the nature of the units. In Sri Lanka, the demand of the Tamils for a separate unit – whether we speak of those that are fighting for a sovereign state or those who are campaigning for federalism – challenges the unitary vision of the state identified with the Sinhala-Buddhists. In India, the dialogue between visions of the 'state-of-the-whole' and parts of the state has been constant, resulting in revisions on all sides.

All kinds of visions seem to have one thing in common: a propensity under certain circumstances to be grounded in a territorial space. This is not irreversible and the territorialized vision is not immutable. We have discussed this earlier as the embodiment of a hitherto abstract vision. The contest in the political arena between a variety of visions would be hard enough to resolve without the visions being concretely manifested in land, in physical and human resources and in geopolitical configurations. As long as a collective vision rests in the realm of ideas, negotiation is facilitated by a reinterpretation of ideas. The moment the idea is 'grounded', it acquires a binary cast – either Tamil country includes Tirupati or it does not. Negotiation on that position is more difficult; it is hard to reinterpret the loss of arable land or to justify the transfer of a village full of Tamil-speakers out of what they have been told is Tamil country. There is much writing on devotion to language and to religion, but both of these are intensified if and when they come to be associated with specific pieces of land.

In order to survive, and in order to minimize conflict, the state has to find ways in which such a dialogue is sustained. This dialogue is carried on in different arenas and through different media. The arenas may be politics, economics, culture and custom. The media include schooling, communications, and formal legislation and rules. In this paper we trace the history of unit demarcation in post-colonial India, Pakistan and Sri Lanka largely through the sequence of changes in units initiated by the 'state-of-the-whole', usually in response to complaints or demands from regionally-based groups within the state.

India

Since 1935, India has experimented with three kinds of units. The variations have been introduced in response to specific group-state exchanges, and they have not been sweeping system-wide transformations. The fundamental position of the constitution has not changed. Differently demarcated units exist side by side, and the reorganization is extra-constitutional in that the constitution does not specify that any particular basis is to be adopted.

British India was ruled largely as a unitary state until the passage of the Government of India Act (1935) which provided the core of what became the constitution of free India. This legislation introduced for the first time the idea of a 'federation' whose units were of two types: provinces that were under direct British rule (governor's provinces and chief commissioner's provinces) and princely states. The princely states never gave their consent to this arrangement; therefore, it prevailed only with regard to the British-ruled provinces. The act of 1935 created two new provinces – Sind out of Bombay and Orissa out of Bengal and other provinces. Sind had been annexed in 1843 and in 1847, it was merged with the Bombay presidency. From then until 1935, Sind was a non-regulation province administered by a commissioner, and it was treated as distinct within the Bombay presidency in that special regulations and administrative arrangements were often made for Sind. Historians of Sind read this period, nevertheless, as one of neglect. Hamida Khuhro for instance, says that not only was Sind a very low priority for the Bombay presidency, but even projects of importance to the empire like the development of Karachi harbour were also delayed.⁴ Therefore, the demand for the re-creation of the province of Sind was raised by the business community, first in 1913, at a Congress meeting, then in 1925 at the Congress, Muslim League and Khilafat conferences. In 1927, the Congress backed the principle of linguistic demarcation of provinces and backed the separation of Sind from Bombay as a place to begin.⁵

What is interesting here is the deployment of different rationales for the same demand. The demand for separation was first raised by Hindu merchants in Sind who did not want to compete with the merchants in Bombay. It was raised on the grounds of regional neglect. When the Congress took it up, it was transformed into a demand for a linguistic province. When the Muslim League took it up, it took on the dimension of protecting the (native) Muslim population of Sind. What happened was that the 1935 act separated Sind from Bombay, but the event took on three different hues, and each of these had something to say about the nature of the whole of which Sind was a part. Sind was an autonomous region in a larger polity whose concern with local welfare was minimal; Sind was a

linguistically self-determined province in a larger imperial holding, whose separation was the first step towards a larger self-determination; Sind was sealed off in such a manner as to reduce the immigration of non-Muslim outsiders, sowing the seeds of a separate homeland for Muslims in South Asia. When the imperial holding became two states, these visions of Sind had implications for the new 'state-of-the-whole' to which it was appended – Pakistan.

The question of what is the appropriate basis for the demarcation of units is one of the most controversial ones in independent India. The 1950 constitution of India begins by describing India as a 'Union of States.'⁶ According to D.D. Basu, Dr B.R. Ambedkar, the chairman of the constitution-drafting committee, had justified the committee's preference for this term 'to indicate two things, viz., (a) that the Indian federation is not the result of an agreement by the units, and (b) that the component units have no freedom to secede from it.'⁷ In other words, the Indian federation is constitutionally a product of devolution by a unitary state. The very next two articles qualify this, giving the central legislature the power to admit or establish new states,⁸ and also to form new states from old ones, to alter the area and composition of any state or rename a state.⁹ These changes require little more than a simple majority in Parliament. There is some mention of consulting the legislature of the state in question, but it is not a prerequisite:¹⁰ 'the affected State or States may express their views but cannot resist the will of Parliament'.¹¹ Therefore, it is a 'union' where the very existence of the units depends to some extent on the union. The union comprises states and union territories, where union territories are centrally administered and under the direct control of Parliament. States enjoy greater autonomy than union territories, and also have greater access to resources, a fact which explains the demand for statehood in many former union territories such as the North-East Frontier Agency (now Arunachal Pradesh), Goa and Delhi.

The first set of units in independent India followed largely *administrative* lines. As they acceded, units were placed in three categories within which they ranged in size, composition and the terms of their relationship with the centre. Independent India was a union, and as the argument in the Constituent Assembly went, the units had no existence prior to the formation of the union. They came into existence as a feature of the union. Therefore, as India commenced, apparently without history, on the basis of the social contract of its peoples, so did the units into which it was divided. When you do not recognize the historicity of units, the question of other historically rooted or shared characteristics becomes irrelevant. Therefore, in the India of modernizing leaders like Nehru, the past and its legacies are not relevant. They must be disregarded as obstructions and it is

India's 'unity in diversity' that must be celebrated. In such a vision of India, administrative efficiency can be the only basis for unit demarcation.

The idea of the administratively defined unit did have historical roots, though.¹² As the British expanded their control over Indian states, they simply appended them to whichever presidency was adjacent. Particularly on the frontier, security and development were the driving forces of any administrative arrangement they devised. The ultimate goal was political stability at the edges of the empire. Administrative (and security) considerations were paramount in the case of frontier provinces, because the administrators needed to be neutral *vis-à-vis* local politics and also the lines of communication needed to be clear and quick to the centre, in the interests of defending the empire. This has always been the justification in large empires for integrative action that tends towards centralization and towards coercion.¹³ This is borne out, too, by the fact that Arunachal Pradesh (post-colonial India's North-East Frontier Agency) was only granted statehood as late as 1987. Until then, it was a centrally administered territory. So it seems that the degree of formal central control increases as one moves away from the centre, in order to maintain the natural advantage of the centre.

What might constitute 'administrative efficiency'? When Lord Curzon partitioned Bengal in 1905, the rationale proffered was administrative convenience. Leaving aside for the moment the political motivation (divide and rule) commonly ascribed to the act, what made it convenient to partition Bengal? The partition of Bengal was meant to facilitate the independent development of Assam and to streamline the administration of Bengal. That it did not serve these purposes well is irrelevant for this discussion. It was part of a larger scheme of reorganization of provinces which took into account area, resources, land tenure and other usages and even culture.¹⁴ This represents a corrective to the earlier British practice of simply creating large units by adding new acquisitions to adjacent units, suggesting that perhaps there is to administrative organization a pattern of large, centralized units until the centre is sure of its paramouncy, followed by a confident downsizing and decentralization. Is administrative organization itself the choice of new systems where the control of the centre has not been established over the periphery and where the ruling class is not yet familiar with its new outer acquisitions? Is there a historical moment for each of these bases of demarcation?

The protest movement that followed the partition presents the first instance of linguistic politics in the subcontinent, almost suggesting that such a transition – from one form of administrative unit to another – triggers the demand for a shift to another basis for unit demarcation. The fact that linguistic identity had so much to do with the reversal of the partition underlined the diversity within Bengal, with its Oriya, Bihari, and Assamese

minorities who did not have their own province. The emphasis shifted away from administrative to identity concerns, from the wider to local interests.

In a period of mass mobilization, linguistic politics was a handy way to organize and it was all the more useful for the fact that the British view on this subject differed so starkly from the Indian. The British did not favour unit demarcation on the basis of language at all. The Montagu-Chelmsford Report (1918) rejected linguistic provinces as impracticable as well as inadequate without equal consideration of other factors like resources, geography and defence. At the Nagpur session of the Indian National Congress, language was accepted as the basis for demarcating units within India. In 1917, the linguistic areas of Andhra (Telugu-speaking) and Sind (Sindi-speaking) had been designated 'Congress Priorities.' In 1920, the Congress was itself reorganized into 21 *pradeshiya* or provincial committees, each of which was linguistic. In the period of the freedom movement, the Congress regarded linguistic provinces as the local expression of the self-determination impulse. Partition changed this view somewhat.

The Dar Commission, which was appointed in 1948, rejected the notion of linguistic provinces on the grounds that they would result in a loss of administrative efficiency, that each such province would also be home to other linguistic communities – minorities within that province – and that they would threaten national unity. 'Administrative convenience' was the principle it favoured, especially in the case of Madras, Bombay and the central provinces. In December 1948, the Congress Party appointed a linguistic provinces committee, comprising Jawaharlal Nehru, Vallabhbhai Patel and Pattabhi Sitaramayya. Their mandate was to look at the question politically rather than administratively. Although this committee also concluded that the idea of linguistic provinces was not a good one, they acknowledged that the demand for them might escalate to a point that not to concede them would harm national unity more. They cited the instance of Andhra as one where the claim to a linguistic state might be legitimate. This opened the floodgates. In 1953, Potti Sriramulu's fast-unto-death forced the hand of the central government. The state of Andhra Pradesh was created in October 1953 and was the first linguistic state.

Although the terms of reference of the states reorganization committee were to keep in mind national unity and the viability of units, the principle of reorganization was implicit in their mandate. The commission did its work over two years in the midst of much debate and discussion on the issue. It recommended that Madras be further reorganized to take into account the sentiments of the Kannadigas and Malayalis, but in the case of Bombay, merely recommended that Vidarbha be carved out of Bombay and Madhya Pradesh. This led to riots as the Marathi-speaking people left in

Bombay had no wish to be marginalized by others in the state. The problem was finally resolved in 1960 with the splitting of Bombay into Maharashtra and Gujarat, keeping Vidarbha in the former.¹⁵ Further, even in the case of Madras, while Andhra Pradesh, Karnataka and Kerala were carved out on the basis of language, Parliament continued to resist designating the remainder of Madras state as Tamil Nadu, a principle that the Pradesh Congress and the Dravida Munnetra Kazhagam both endorsed. It seems that in this case, the view that linguistic reorganization was undertaken to checkmate the growing support in the south for Dravidistan was unfounded. The terms of reorganization left the secessionist party dissatisfied and the rhetoric of separation gathered force until 1962–3. In 1963, with the formation of Nagaland as part of the settlement of that long-running insurgency, there were 16 linguistic states, several of which had minorities that spoke other languages. Forty years later, on 15 August 1996, the prime minister of India, H.D. Deve Gowda, announced in his Independence Day address that the government was going to grant statehood to a region within India's largest state: Uttarakhand out of Uttar Pradesh. This is the region of the northern Himalayan foothills. The announcement set in motion a renewal of demands from other regions within large states, like Vidarbha in Maharashtra, Gorkhland in West Bengal, Telengana in Andhra Pradesh, and Jharkhand in Bihar.¹⁶

The Uttar Pradesh had resolved a couple of times earlier to recommend to the centre that a separate state should be created out of the eight hill districts of the state. This was a proposal favoured by successive state governments. The centre had not been known to favour the proposal before this, although the arguments were old and had been presented to the states reorganization commission: the hill districts were culturally and geographically distinct and now, in the intervening years, had been neglected. It was thought that setting up special hill development councils or schemes would redress the neglect, but over the years, all political parties in the area seemed to have come around to the view that statehood or some measure of the sort was inevitable. At the time of Deve Gowda's announcement, however, there was no consensus about the form it should take. The procedure for drafting the requisite legislation began on 16 August 1996 as per article 3. Not much has changed since then.

Thus we see that in the Indian case, the bases of unit demarcation were reviewed repeatedly as a response to the struggles of identity groups for autonomy. The first shift to a rationale of administrative convenience was prompted by the complaints of Sind and Andhra that they were being neglected – although both were also identified as 'linguistic provinces' by some political groups like the Congress. The second shift, in 1956, also followed the Andhra agitation. The occasional promotions to statehood of

former union territories also amount to recognition that the people of the state have 'come of age' as an identity group and that they will now take their place in the polity at large. Finally, with the Uttarakhand province, we see echoes of the arguments heard in Sind in the 1920s and 1930s. In sum, each change in demarcation has been prompted by a challenge to the identity of the 'state-of-the-whole'.

Pakistan

Pakistan has always been a federation, and so it behoves us to ask why its internal structure has so consistently been a source of political discontent. To answer this, let us pick up the narrative of Pakistan's constitutional development at the moment of partition and independence. India received independence as the successor-state of the British Empire, having to deal with the integration only of those parts that had *de jure* been outside the empire. In contrast, Pakistan, which seceded from the empire, was formed as a result of provincial legislatures and leaders choosing to form a separate state.

In 1947, under Mountbatten's plan for partition, the legislatures of Bengal and Punjab would each meet in two sections, comprising in each case the Hindu and Muslim majority districts. The decision against partition would have to be unanimous. If either section chose to separate, then the process of partition would be under way. The section would also determine which constituent assembly would draft its constitution. The Sind legislative assembly would also choose which of the two constituent assemblies would frame its constitution. A referendum would be held in the Northwest Frontier Province (NWFP), and some mechanism would be worked out for Baluchistan. A referendum would be held in Sylhet to determine whether it would remain in Assam or be transferred to East Bengal. Thus, all the provinces that came together to form Pakistan had to choose to do so. Contrast this with the provinces of India that lay outside the heartland – even using multiple definitions of heartland.¹⁷ These provinces were deemed, by virtue of their Hindu majority, to be part of India. Where anybody had a choice – for example, the princely states of Junagadh and Hyderabad – *realpolitik* limited that choice. Theoretically, the formation of Pakistan is an act that is closer to the creation of a social contract than was the formation of India or Sri Lanka. For the most part, within the limits imposed by representative rather than direct democracy, this was an act reinforced by overt consent. Why was Pakistan the first country in the post-colonial era to experience secession?

Many answers are offered for this – the role that India played; the dominance of one ethnic group (the Punjabis); the nationalism of the

Bengalis – and all of them are correct. It is argued here, however, that one needs to look at the nature of Pakistani federalism to see what made all of these things possible. Yes, Pakistan was a federation, but it was a federation whose federating units were demarcated in a manner that was deeply ambiguous and that lent itself to a variety of interpretations.

The ambiguity of Pakistan's unit demarcation stems from four facts. First, the provinces and regions of Pakistan predate Pakistan itself. K.K. Aziz, who has undertaken to trace the genesis of the idea of Pakistan through every speech and article on the subject, identifies several views on how to resolve the Hindu-Muslim equation in the subcontinent.¹⁸ These fall into three groups: those who sought electoral representation (separate electorates), those who sought a federalist solution, and those who favoured a separate sovereign state. In the 80 years or so (1858–1940) that Aziz's survey covers, influence shifted from the first to the last solution.

Unlike most other cases of separatism, Indian Muslim separatism had no 'natural territory', no obvious home, no 'traditional homeland'. There were areas in which Muslims had ruled, and areas in which Muslims had long been a majority, but until this historical moment, there was no area that in common political talk would have been necessarily and naturally a Muslim homeland. Muslims lived all over the subcontinent. So the task of those who spoke of either federal or separatist solutions was to identify territorial units for federating or for a separate state. It was easy to identify the Muslim *qaum* (people, nation), and therefore, separate electorates were easy to conceive. In order, however, to organize a dispersed population with some pockets of concentration into a state, some scheme of territorial allocation is called for. There were several ideas that attempted to meet this need.

The argument of this section is that it is significant that most of these were lists of ethnoterritorial entities or units – Sindhis/Sind, Punjabis/Punjab, for instance.¹⁹ To envision Pakistan thus and then to expect the different identities to be effaced is unrealistic. The territorial bases suggested for the Muslim state ranged from the simple division of the subcontinent into two parts, north and south of the Vindhyas, to the elaborate rearrangement of populations and jurisdictions.²⁰

The earliest proposals for a separate Muslim state divided the subcontinent into a Muslim north and a Hindu south (Akbar Allahabadi, 1905; Rahmat Ali, 1915; Wahabuddin Kamboh, 1923; Sardar Gul Khan, 1923; Abdus Samad Rajisthani, 1938). They gave way to those proposals that were a little more specific about what constituted the north. Initially, it is interesting that the proposals (at least those discussed by Aziz) focus on the north-western part of the subcontinent; Bengal and Hyderabad enter into the discussion later. In 1879, Jamaluddin Afghani is said to have proposed a Muslim republic comprising Muslim central Asia, Afghanistan, and

Muslim-majority areas in the north-west. In 1918, the Aga Khan visualized a north-western Indus province in a south Asian federation comprising Sind, NWFP, and Baluchistan. Ten years later, he talked about joining Muslim provinces of north and west India into a separate state. In 1920, M.A.Q. Bilgrami suggested the partition of Punjab and Bengal, and the creation of a separate province of Sind. In 1928, M.A.K. Maikash is quoted as suggesting a Muslim national homeland comprising Punjab, Sind, Baluchistan and NWFP. In 1930, Iqbal suggested a state comprising Punjab, NWFP, Sind and Baluchistan.²¹ In 1933, Rahmat Ali made his famous suggestion that a separate state – Pakistan – be formed comprising Punjab, NWFP, Kashmir, Sind, and Baluchistan. In 1937, M.H. Gazdar proposed a separate federation of Punjab, Sind, NWFP and Baluchistan. In the same year, Rahmat Ali advocated the creation of a separate Muslim state of Bang-i-Islam constituted by Bengal and Assam, and two years later, he added Osmanistan (Hyderabad) to the list of states he advocated.

As the clamor for partition mounted among the Muslim leadership and as it seemed more and more inevitable to the Muslims, schemes for partition became very detailed and involved massive transfers of population. Some of their features include corridors to link the north-west with Bengal, the creation of a Muslim block in the Gangetic heartland with the migration of populations from other areas and, most dramatically, the suggestion that the Maharajah of Kashmir and the Nawab of Hyderabad exchange their states! It is important to note that almost every way of visualizing what would constitute the new Muslim state involved the listing of regions that are identified by the ethnic community residing there (or the other way around, but the point is that there is a dominant ethnic group in each of these areas). This clearly indicates that in the creation of Pakistan, the building blocks were regions with forms and histories that preceded Pakistan. The 'state of the whole' is created by the coming together of the parts here, and therefore, is *either equal to or more than* the sum of its parts, but it cannot be *other than* what its parts are, taken together.

When Pakistan finally came into existence, it came into existence with two wings – an eastern wing comprising East Bengal and the Sylhet district of Assam, and a western wing, comprising West Punjab, NWFP, Sind and Baluchistan. (Parts of Kashmir subsequently came under Pakistani control.) The two wings were divided by Indian territory, and formed two 'natural' units of the Pakistani state. This would seem to simplify the question of unit demarcation, except that the ethnic composition of the two wings was not anywhere similar. The eastern wing was preponderantly Bengali-speaking, although there were Biharis who had migrated there during partition, as well as Assamese and Chakmas. The other groups were very small minorities, and the Bengali impress upon the eastern wing gave it a homogeneous cast.

The western wing was quite different. Not only was it composed of provinces/regions that had been the building-blocks of the idea of Pakistan – Punjab, Sind, NWFP and Baluchistan, to say nothing of Kashmir – but it also had tremendous cultural diversity within it. Several of the communities had occupied their region for centuries and the land bore the mark of their histories ineffably. To treat the two wings as similar units, as the 'one unit' system did, was to ignore this fact. It was also to raise the question of what, other than the accident of geography, was the basis of unit demarcation. In the east, it would seem to have been ethnicity as well as geography, and in the west, it was merely geography.

When you work your way back from the resulting 'vision' of the unit to the 'vision' of the whole, you have two different takes on what post-colonial Pakistan actually was, as opposed to what the vision had been prior to independence. If you were from East Pakistan, then as your unit might well have been defined by ethnicity, the state would seem to have to be a culmination of many singular ethnic units. Therefore, the actions of such a state *vis-à-vis* cultural policy must seem like the actions of either a state that is a composite of many ethnic groups or one that is not ethnically neutral. The reaction of the East Pakistanis to Urdu as the national language bears this out. If the state was a composite of their dominant ethnic group and others, then that was the action of a state that had chosen one of its components over others. From the perspective of the West Pakistanis, this was not as much of an issue largely because it was their language that had been selected, but there is also the fact that since they now formed a unit in which their individual identities had been effaced, the state from their perspective was a legal composite of two geographical wings. It does not follow, from a unit that has no ethnic basis, that the state would have one. Their anxieties surrounded the population differential between the two wings, and the fear of always being outvoted by the East.

Two different, if not contrasting, visions follow from the ambiguity of the basis of unit demarcation. To be sure, it was a function of geography, but were there ways of undermining that geography? The creation of smaller units in either wing, for instance, might have undermined the ethnic basis in the east – but would the natural next step in the west have been the retention of the old ethnoterritorial regions, thus reversing the situation? Any single system of unit demarcation would have proven problematic sooner or later, given the awkward geography of the post-colonial Pakistani state. In 50 years, the state has, however, experimented with three systems. In 1947, as noted, the Pakistani state was created out of the constitutive choices of its units. These, it left initially as they were, except for carving Karachi out of Sind as the federal capital – a choice which would have grave consequences for Karachi in the 1980s and 1990s.

In 1955, the 'one unit' system was introduced. By this system, a false parity was introduced between East and West Pakistan, by consolidating them into the two federating units in the state. The four constitutive provinces of West Pakistan were merged to create that unit. The idea was that this would help the west balance the numerical dominance of the east. That is, the population of East Bengal was so much larger than that of the provinces in the west that the east would have dominated any federal legislature. By creating two units of equal importance, the potential dominance of the east was diminished. From the perspective of the east, it would now be underrepresented in the federal legislature. On the other hand, regional parties and leaders were unhappy over their displacement as their spheres of influence disappeared overnight. More importantly, 'one unit' meant greater centralization and the result pleased no one save the centre.

After the secession of Bangladesh, the old provinces were restored in another federal arrangement. Today, their relation to the federal government is no more equal than before, but they do have their identities.

Finally, the identity of the 'state of the whole' suggested that there could be no differences within, contradicting the first three facts. Pakistan has been an Islamic state in all its three constitutions. The state is exhorted in each of these to create such a climate that the differences between Muslims are erased, that Muslims are no longer divided among themselves. Where does this leave a state which was first formed as a union of regions which had Muslim majorities, but was nonetheless as a union of regions? The normative emphasis on erasing differences, and the need for groups and regions to retain their identity and relative autonomy, are framed in classic opposition here.

Karachi exemplifies this. In the early years after independence, when the federal capital was located at Karachi, the city attracted a large number of migrants from India (*Muhajirs*). These people came from those provinces in India that had lent the greatest support to the Pakistan movement. They settled in Karachi and they dominated the administrative class. Over decades, the combined immigration into Karachi of labour from nearby provinces and the growing dominance of the *Muhajir* community led to the marginalization of the 'indigenous' Sindi population. On the one hand, undeniably, Karachi made its appearance in history as a Sindi city, but on the other, like all port cities, it has always attracted outsiders, particularly after Sind was merged with the Bombay Presidency. The *Muhajir* settlement of Karachi was not even the latest of the waves of immigrants in the city's history. In the battle for Karachi, three claims are at stake and all three are fundamental to the identity of the collective that makes them. The Sindis claim Karachi because their dominance in their eponymous province is restricted to the rural areas. The *Muhajirs* claim Karachi because they

have nowhere else in Pakistan. The state has an interest in neutralizing either claim because like Bombay in India and Colombo in Sri Lanka, Karachi is the economic magnet for labour from its hinterland and thus it is critical to the state that no parochial claim is entirely recognized. Cities like the three mentioned above epitomize the secularizing, modernizing, identity-effacing drive of the modern nation-state. The identity of the state-of-the-whole of Pakistan is written also in the identity of Karachi, as it is in all other units.

The demarcation of units may not be the most pressing issue in the politics of Pakistan, but it appears in the post-colonial political history of the state as one of the consistent threads in the warp and weft of its fabric. Units appear in the early visions of the state, and they come together to create the state. The state's experiments with their demarcation render its own definition ambiguous and finally, when the units reappear, they do so in strange contrast to the monochrome assumed by the state-of-the-whole. In fact, Pakistan is the most telling example of the relationship between identity and internal unit demarcation that is outlined here.

Sri Lanka

How do you manage a unitary state composed of two peoples with territorial bases who view themselves as distinct nations? This is the question that Sri Lanka has grappled with for five decades.

The unitary state that the Colebrooke-Cameron reforms initiated in 1829 continues in independent Sri Lanka. The British were the first to extend their sovereignty over the entire island and their creation of the unitary state is attributed to a wish to increase and institutionalize their control over the island. The first would be achieved because the unitary, centralized state would diminish the importance and therefore, power of the Kandyan chieftains. The second would be accomplished as a centralized administration would be better able to plan and develop a communications system for the island. This is similar to their early policy in India.

In the early years, representation in the political arrangements in Colombo served as the bone of contention between rivals in the Colombo élite, who happened also to be ethnically different. However, this rivalry enlisted the rhetoric of two distinct nations,²² who must be represented in one state. Battles over representation involved definition of the group to be represented and part of that definition was territorial. In the 1940s, S.W.R.D. Bandaranaike, who was minister for local government affairs, began to espouse the creation of provincial councils. This idea was stillborn, however, although it was closely identified with Bandaranaike's support base and with the Federal Party.

In its founding resolution in 1949, the Federal Party asserted that Tamils needed to have 'their own autonomous state guaranteeing self-government and self-determination for the Tamil nation in the country.'²³ K.M. de Silva says that in the original Tamil version of the Federal Party's resolution, it is hard to tell whether the Tamils wanted autonomy or separatism. Therefore, that agenda of the Federal Party lent itself to every incarnation of the Tamil nationalist impulse. In 1951, the Federal Party claimed that 'the Tamil-speaking people in [Sri Lanka] constituted a nation distinct from that of the Sinhalese in every fundamental test of nationhood'.²⁴ The Federal Party also raised the allegation of 'colonization' – or the relocation of Sinhalese in the newly irrigated areas of the north-east. They alleged that the government was trying to alter the demographic balance between ethnic groups in the area. The 'traditional homelands' of the Tamils made their first appearance at this time as the Federal Party resolved that the 'Tamil-speaking people have an inalienable right to the territories which they have been traditionally occupying.'²⁵ In 1956, at its national convention, the Federal Party referred to the 'traditional homelands of the Tamil-speaking people', who were being overwhelmed 'in their own national areas.'²⁶ These areas were soon after identified as the Northern and Eastern provinces. Thus, the 'traditional homelands' idea was first mooted and used in the context of the government's resettlement policy and was an element of the solution proposed by the Bandaranaike-Chelvanayagam Pact to this problem. If a local authority was going to make decisions about the allocation of reclaimed arable land and employment, what was to constitute 'local'?

The Bandaranaike-Chelvanayagam Pact was signed in January 1956. At this point, the 'communal' element was still seen as being in the minority within each community.²⁷ In the quest to isolate it, the pact agreed that regional councils would constitute the unit of devolution, where the Northern Province would constitute one province and the Eastern Province would constitute two or more regions. This was in recognition of the diversity of the Eastern Province. Regions might merge, with the merger subject to ratification by Parliament, and they might collaborate. The right of Tamils to use their language for administrative and court business was also recognized. The regional councils were granted power to make decisions about local development issues and about the re-settlement of population in newly irrigated areas. While the regional councils were welcomed, the pact did not recognize the north-east as a Tamil area in the way that linguistic states in India did. The Bandaranaike-Chelvanayagam Pact's proposal to create regional councils was abrogated within a year, faced with opposition from the Eksath Bhikkhu Peramuna, the United National Party and the Tamil Congress. Thereafter, the demand for regional autonomy abated.²⁸

The 1965 agreement between Dudley Senanayake and S. J. V. Chelvanayagam settled on the district as the unit of devolution, setting up district councils whose powers would be agreed upon in the national interest. Tamils should get priority for resettlement in the newly irrigated areas of the north. Early legislation providing for the use of Tamil in administrative transactions all over the island was to be implemented. Stopping far short of the Bandaranaike-Chelvanayagam Pact, this was however, accepted by the Federal Party, a member of which assumed the local government portfolio in the Cabinet. The Federal Party described this pact as a stage in the ongoing negotiation of a settlement between the two communities. Critics accused the Tamil leadership of placing class interests before the interests of the Tamil masses, a charge that still resonates in Tamil circles today. Fissures also developed between the Tamil parties and the left.²⁹ With the formation of the Tamil United Front (TUF) in 1972, an attempt was made to bring together the now-splintered Tamil leadership of the Federal Party and the All-Ceylon Tamil Congress.

Parallel to the brewing ethnic crisis, there was some debate and progress on decentralization in the context of development administration in Sri Lanka, with the discussion focusing on district development councils. The 1972 and 1978 constitutions established Sri Lanka as an ethnically identified and explicitly unitary state. The 1978 constitution specified that the unit of devolution was the district and listed their names. In rejection of the 1972 constitution, S.J.V. Chelvanayagam resigned from Parliament. By the time that he campaigned for his seat again, the complexion of Tamil politics had changed enough that the idea of *Tamil Eelam* [homeland] had crept into the campaign rhetoric.³⁰ The traditional homelands idea gained ground even as the grievances of Tamils grew in number. In 1976, in the Vaddukodai Resolution, the Tamil United Liberation Front (TULF) espoused the idea of a *Tamil Eelam* for the first time. To do so, they drew on a history of Tamil statehood that had been narrated authoritatively and persuasively by scholars like C. Suntheralingam.³¹ *Tamil Eelam* was to consist of the Northern and Eastern provinces of Sri Lanka. In the period of Indian mediation in the crisis, Tamil 'traditional homelands' were part of the Tamil representation to the Indian government, and the success of that representation was evident in the selection of the province as the unit of devolution and the merger, albeit temporary, of the Northern and Eastern provinces.

After the 1983 riots, the TULF withdrew from Parliament and an all-party conference was convened to discuss the political crisis. The conference set up one committee to look expressly into the question of the unit of devolution. The conference faced a deadlock between two non-negotiable positions: one that would concede nothing more than district

councils and the other unwilling to settle for anything less than regional councils. President Jayawardene's solution was to promote inter-district cooperation. Later in 1984, the conference managed a consensus on many questions short of supporting provincial councils as the main subnational unit. The hierarchy of government went, top-to-bottom, thus: the national government in Colombo – inter-district coordination – district councils – urban and municipal councils – *pradeshiya mandalaya*. This was rejected by the TULF. As India became more and more involved with the process of negotiation in Sri Lanka, Indian government officials came up with their own suggestions, but the thrust of all of them was to favour the region or the province as the unit of devolution. Although this was originally anathema, the turn of events saw the passage of the Pradeshiya Sabhas Act in 1987 and the establishment of the provincial legislatures. Ten years after the Indo-Sri Lanka Accord of 1987, while the province seems to have replaced the district as the first unit of devolution, there is still no consensus about the basis of its demarcation (as opposed to level).

In the case of Sri Lanka, the unit of devolution was contentious for three reasons. The first point of contention had to do with whether the district or another level of government (such as the province) should be the unit. This is what the discussions in the 1980s revolved around. The second point of contention was whether the creation of a new unit or level of government meant the changing of the basic nature of the unitary state. This is what fuels the strongest opposition to devolution. But the third point remains the most contentious to date, even as the idea that some kind of devolution is unavoidable is accepted, no matter how reluctantly. This is the question of what shall demarcate the unit. The Tamil demand for devolution assumes that the unit of devolution will be coterminous with the traditional homeland they claim. The problem with that is twofold. One, the historical bases of that claim itself are specious. Two, the category 'Tamil' in this claim is also contested. Tamils have tended to include the Muslims of Sri Lanka in their number because they are largely Tamil-speaking. So the category 'Tamil' is actually 'Tamil-speaking.' The Muslims, however, have never regarded themselves as part of this community. The more conservative among the Sinhalese, in their dispute with the Tamils, use this as an additional reason not to concede the extent of devolution desired by the Tamils.

Thus, in Sri Lanka, we see that as the idea of the 'state-of-the-whole' became more and more contentious, ideas of alternative ways of demarcating spaces within that whole – in this case, an island – crystallized into expressions of that contestation. Again, the relationship between the idea of the 'state-of-the-whole' and the way in which that whole is structured is shown to be close, even symbiotic.

The Identity-Unit Demarcation Relationship: Closing Thoughts

The three cases examined here suggest that the idea that national identity is expressed through internal unit demarcation bears further investigation. In India, changes in the bases of unit demarcation follow demands from identity groups for greater autonomy. In Pakistan, national identity is the sum of consenting units with distinct identities. In Sri Lanka, the rejection of the national identity is expressed as the demand for a separate unit. The larger work from which this paper is drawn also studies the histories of regional groups in these countries. Those histories reinforce this view of the relationship between identity and internal unit demarcation. A sense of self and the concomitant demands that a group makes acquire a territorial dimension soon enough, and it is really at this point that the contest between them and the state intensifies.

If this holds, then reorganization of units is in fact the conflict resolution measure as India has used it. More often than not, states do not have a choice, and creating a new unit may buy the state some time before a group goes from identifying to actualizing as a new state the embodiment of its vision. The rule of thumb, experience suggests, is flexibility. What distinguishes the Indian experience, all its failures notwithstanding, seems to be the willingness of the state-of-the-whole, by and large, to enter into *ad hoc*, case-by-case arrangements of its territory and polity. This has resulted in a plethora of special provisions and awkward exceptions to the neat hierarchy of administrative units, but it has kept conflict to a minimum. It is in those instances and periods that the state has been unwilling to do this, that conflict has become unmanageable. The idea that internal unit demarcation is an expression of national identity explains this reluctance – in India, in Pakistan and in Sri Lanka. Equally, unilateral decisions about unit demarcation undermine group identity or the terms on which the group has acceded to the national identity, and therefore they too are bitterly contested, as we see with Pakistan and the 'one unit' arrangement.

If the territorialization of collective vision is detrimental to the goal of a lasting and sustainable integration in society, then how is it to be prevented? What cannot be done is to change overnight the nature of an inter-state system that begins with territorial units. Short of that, there are a few things that can be attempted, by state and non-state agents.

- Pre-emptive alleviation of the proto-territorial collectivity's fears and insecurities.
- The suggestion of alternative histories to those laying claim to the territorial space of an administrative unit.
- The facilitation of communication and interaction that diminish the salience of internal boundaries.

- The devolution of power to those regions that might become 'traditional homelands', but without their recognition as such, prior to the association of the area with such a claim.
- Demarcation of administrative units within the state, not as a fiat, but as a consultative process, so that the bases of demarcation shall be commonly agreed.
- Recognition that for a state, external boundaries are much more important than internal, and that therefore flexibility and responsiveness on questions of internal demarcation are possible.

This paper is part of a larger effort to establish inductively the terms and conditions whereby a 'national community' may be forged by a state within its populace. The argument that territory and identity are closely related is given operational form here as the establishment of a relationship between the identity of a collective and the way in which space is organized within, reflecting the relationships in which the collective holds its components. The argument may be now further tested in a larger number of historical cases to determine its veracity and validity.

NOTES

1. Barry Buzan, *People, States and Fear* (Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner, 1992), p.65.
2. Gaston Bachelard, *The Poetics of Space* (New York: The Orion Press, 1964), p.5.
3. Michael Taussig, *The Magic of the State* (New York: Routledge, 1997).
4. Hamida Khuro, *The Making of Modern Sind: British Policy and Social Change in the Nineteenth Century* (Karachi: Indus Publications, 1978), pp.14-15.
5. Suhail Zaheer Lari, *A History of Sind* (Karachi: Oxford, 1994), pp.179.
6. *The Constitution of India*, Part I, Article 1(1).
7. Durga Das Basu, *Introduction to the Constitution of India* (New Delhi: Prentice-Hall of India, 1982), p.49. He points out that constitutions as varied as the US, South Africa (1909) and the USSR (1936) all have used the word 'union.' In the pages that follow, Basu provides a discussion of what constitutes a federal constitution and the points of consonance and dissonance between the Indian constitution and such a constitution.
8. *Indian Constitution*, Article 2.
9. *Ibid.*, Article 3.
10. 'Provided that no Bill for the purpose shall be introduced in either House of Parliament except on the recommendation of the President and unless, where the proposal contained in the Bill affects the area, boundaries or name of any of the States, the Bill has been referred by the President to the Legislature of that State for expressing its views thereon within such period as may be specified in the reference or within such further period as the President may allow and the period so specified or allowed has expired.' *Indian Constitution*, Article 3, proviso.
11. Basu, p.67.
12. The main source for the historical information in the paragraphs that follow is B.B. Misra, *The Unification and Division of India* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1990). Misra has provided a detailed and authoritative account of the process of integrating the territories of princely India and British India into post-colonial India.
13. Swarna Rajagopalan, 'Regime Maintenance in Two Pre-Modern Indian Polities', unpublished, 1993.

14. Misra, pp.158-67.
15. In 1995-6, the United Front government at the centre has accepted in principle the idea of smaller states, throwing open the issue of Vidarbha and other regions once again.
16. 'Uttarakhand, not the last', *The Indian Express*, pp.8-17, 96.
17. In the context of British India, the heartland could be construed as the Hindi heartland, or the three presidency areas, whose claim to be 'centre' was stronger in the political economy sense in this period.
18. K.K. Aziz, *A History of the Idea of Pakistan*, Vols.1-4 (Lahore: Vanguard, 1987). The first three volumes survey and discuss the context, content and historiography of each contribution to the development of the idea. At the end of the third volume, Aziz sorts the ideas and their authors in a variety of ways - by idea, by period, by education, by origin. The last volume is a bibliography of works cited. Two companion volumes of *Prelude to Pakistan 1930-40: Documents and readings illustrating the growth of the idea of Pakistan*, edited by K.K. Aziz, were published by Vanguard, Lahore, 1992. Together, the two sets form an invaluable resource for students of Pakistani history, given the paucity of historical writing in that country in the post-colonial period. This section draws on Aziz's comprehensive account.
19. Aziz's Table 13 in Vol.3, *A History of the Idea of Pakistan*, encapsulates the territorial demands made by 15 proponents of partition.
20. While the following section talks only about schemes originated by Indian Muslims, there were several Europeans and Indian Hindus who also proposed territorial divisions. It should be noted that Aziz discusses the problems of attribution and sources for each of these at length. In this section, I have decided to ignore that discussion because it is not germane to our discussion whether Afghani, for instance, did in fact propose what he did, when it is widely believed that he did so. We are concerned with the ideas with which people are believed to have come up, and to the visions of the state that these have built.
21. This is usually interpreted as a suggestion for a separate state, but Aziz contests this interpretation. Again, while Aziz is convincing, since it is the commonly held ideas about the territorial bases of the Pakistani state we are researching, this will be included here.
22. It is interesting that this is something that happened in Sri Lankan politics and in the politics of the Dravidian movement at this time, and that it parallels the Pakistan Movement. The latter appears to have inspired at least the Dravidian movement by their own admission and allusion. It would be an interesting study that asked to what extent the Dravidian movement influenced changes in Sri Lankan politics.
23. Quoted in K.M. de Silva, *The 'traditional homelands' of the Tamils* (Kandy: International Centre for Ethnic Studies, 1995), p.6. This monograph is the main source for the information in the next few paragraphs. It provides an excellent account of the development of this idea, and then critiques its historical validity.
24. *Ibid.*, p.7.
25. *Ibid.*, p.7. The centrality of colonial arguments to much that happens today is illustrated by the fact that one of the sources most often cited as proof of this claim is Cleghorn's Minute (1799) - the work of a British administrator, Hugh Cleghorn. The minute states that from the earliest times, the island has been occupied by two distinct nations, concentrated and 'possessing' very different parts of the island.
26. De Silva, p.8.
27. Ketheshwaran Loganathan, *Sri Lanka: Lost Opportunities* (Colombo: Centre for Policy Research and Analysis, University of Colombo, 1996), p.20.
28. The next two paragraphs are based on the account in Victor Gunawardena, 'Provincial Councils System: A Critical Perspective', in Chanaka Amaratunga (ed.), *Ideas for Constitutional Reform: Proceedings of a series of seven seminars on the Constitution of Sri Lanka conducted by the Council for Liberal Democracy, November 1987-June 1989* (Colombo: Council for Liberal Democracy, 1989).
29. Loganathan, pp.36-7.
30. *Ibid.*, pp.57-9.
31. De Silva, p.12.