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## **National Integration in India, Sri Lanka and Pakistan: Constitutional and Élite Visions**

SWARNA RAJAGOPALAN

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How do states envision themselves and what is the vision of élite members of nationalities within the state? What does the panoply of visions and voices at play in the political arena tell us about the project of national integration? A summary of the available scholarly writing on integration, co-operation and nation-building sets the backdrop for an examination of self-defining propositions from the Indian, Pakistani and Sri Lankan constitutions and a digest of ideas on integration expressed by élite interview respondents in Madras, India and Colombo, Sri Lanka in 1996. The article concludes by deriving a definition of integration from these sources.

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In the half-century since they attained independence, the three states of South Asia included in this study have undertaken a project that at least two countries call 'national integration.' This is the project being evaluated by this work. Such an evaluation must be preceded by the exploration of definitions and visions. What does 'national integration' mean – to scholars, to policy-makers and to the people who are its object?

Using as a point of departure the writing in several areas of political science – integration theory, political development and co-operation under conditions of anarchy – we might summarily draw certain broad propositions. Each area of inquiry yields one definition of integration: Integration is the creation of networks for co-operative action.<sup>1</sup> Integration is a process whereby actors come together, shifting (at least some of) their loyalties to a collective entity.<sup>2</sup> Integration has occurred, to a greater or lesser degree, when the people living in an area feel a sense of community, having learned a shared history and habits.<sup>3</sup> Integration is a rationalizing process that is necessary for development, adjusting the traditional to the modern, the greater to the lesser traditions and smoothening the path of modernization.<sup>4</sup> Integration is a form of cooperative action.<sup>5</sup> These five definitions may be combined into one proposition: *Integration is a process whereby the co-operation of the several creates, over a period of time, a*

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*more or less singular entity, whose creation facilitates action and change, and in which the several repose their allegiance to a greater or lesser degree.*

There are limitations to such a definition. First, it disregards the process whereby the singular creates the several, sometimes in its own image. Indeed were this true, states would not need to strategize integration because their very existence would belie that need. Second, there is a contradiction of sorts that inheres in viewing integration on the one hand as a process in its own right and then as a means to a goal. Further, when it is a means to a goal, the goal acquires primacy and the imperatives of that goal remove ethical and other constraining conditions from the means to achieving that goal. Proceeding with this definition, that is, it would be absolutely essential to achieve integration, at any cost, because that is simply a prelude to something else. Fourth, it suggests that once achieved, integration is static and non-negotiable, when in fact it is always up for redefinition. Fifth, in treating the several as equal, it ignores the role of inequality in the dynamic that engenders co-operation among them. Moreover, following from that, it does not take into account what is lost when the several unite, assuming that it will be for the best.

In this paper, we will compare this academic idea with the visions contained in constitutional documents and the views expressed by opinion-leaders in Colombo and Madras, attempting to define inductively (national) integration. When one compares the definitions drawn from each of these sources, it is evident that certain debates (assimilation versus synthesis, more versus less state intervention, ethnically identified versus ethnically neutral states, the use of coercion and the limits to the desirability of integration) lie at the core of this conceptual confusion and profusion. The paper concludes with a working definition of what constitutes integration, and particularly, national integration.

### **Constitutional Visions**

States do not read political science theory and perhaps this is something for which we should all be thankful.<sup>6</sup> How do the states of India, Sri Lanka and Pakistan envision themselves? To answer this question, constitutions are used as the state's central self-portrait. Constitutions typically contain statements of what the state is or means to be; they spell out the rights of citizens as individuals and as members of groups; they describe the internal structure of the state. States also describe themselves or describe their idealized vision of themselves in other forums. Extra-constitutional policy documents on education, state employment, language, travel and tourism and economic planning are good instances of this. The state also propagates

its self-image through the mass media and through any control it exercises over the education system. These two expressions (constitutional and extra-constitutional) of the vision are not necessarily identical or even similar. Typically, the extra-constitutional rhetoric is more inclusive, although here too, states can exhibit schizophrenia. For instance, the state's policy on language can be exclusionary and its tourist literature can celebrate the polyglot nature of its society.

In the state rhetoric in South Asia, 'national integration' is used to describe both what they see as a prevailing state of affairs and what they define as a conscious process. 'Unity in diversity' is an expression many South Asians invoke to describe their societies. States are not exceptions to this, seeing themselves as political spaces occupied by people who speak different languages, following different faiths and having somewhat different histories (although the erasure of these different histories is a project most states pursue). They pride themselves on this, and this pride comes partly from their prevalence over these differences, which is proven by their continued existence.

One of the most striking differences between the way academics have viewed integration and the way states have is in their view of what is to be integrated. For academics, that object seems to be primarily an integration or streamlining of authoritative functions and then, of groups. Identity issues do not figure in this literature. For states, they are primary. It is people of different sorts that must be brought into the whole that is the state. The national integration rhetoric of the state is therefore a rhetoric about people, culture and identity. The conversation between the state and groups, and among groups themselves, reflects this emphasis.

In the section that follows, constitutions will be used as the primary source of information, simply because they are available for all the states, and they address all the citizenry equally. Constitutional provisions that take the form 'India/Sri Lanka/Pakistan is ...' will be listed and analyzed in each state's constitutional documents. Changes or shifts over time in that core definition, as well as internal contradictions, will be highlighted.

### **India**

The preamble of the Indian Constitution tells us that on 26 November 1949, the people of India constituted themselves into a 'sovereign, democratic republic'. Twenty-six years later, the people of India, acting through their representatives, acquired two more attributes: 'socialism' and 'secularism'. Having come together as individual citizens of a newly free India, the people then constituted one republic. The preamble also contains a description of the vision that was ostensibly theirs: a republic in which all

citizens would be assured social and political justice, freedom of expression and conscience and equality of status and opportunity and which would promote 'FRATERNITY assuring the dignity of the individual and the unity of the Nation'. To this last, oddly, was added in 1975 the word 'integrity'. The preamble thus speaks for a collection of individuals, but these individuals clearly make room, in the mandate they create for the republic, for their differences, individual and collective. This is implicit in the kind of liberties that are envisioned herein, and is also clear when one reads the provisions on justice and equality with some of the provisions of part III ('Fundamental Rights').

The 1976 additions to the preamble both emphasize the diversity of these 'people of India'. The first addition makes a point of saying that India is a secular (and socialist, but that is not pertinent here)<sup>7</sup> republic. The second adds the promotion of the unity and integrity of the nation to the task of assuring the dignity of the individual. One reads these two additions together, in light of the circumstances in which the Forty-second Amendment was passed, and realizes that they indicate two things. First, they confirm what we already know from memories of the Emergency (1975–77) – that the consensus around the nature of the republic was fraying. We can read this in the fact that where the original preamble spoke primarily about individuals, one of whose attributes was their membership of a collective, both of these additions refer directly to the idea that the people of India are really the peoples of India – that they belong to many different groups. If India is not made up of individuals but groups, then it must be a different India. When the consensus frays in such an India, the issue is not just unity, but a determined 'integrity' or staying intact. Second, and this follows from the last point, this is another milestone in a path that began with the Sixteenth Amendment, which outlawed secessionist activity or rhetoric. This is significant because in the struggle to preserve the fraying consensus, 'secularism' and 'unity and integrity of the nation' became two of the fundamental arguments for actions taken in the name of national security. During the Emergency, for instance, the civil liberties of individuals associated with 'communal' organizations were violated precisely on this pretext.

In the first article of the constitution, this republic, 'India, that is Bharat', went on to describe itself as a 'Union of States'. This is a striking self-definition for two reasons. The first is the juxtaposition, in the English text of the constitution, of both the republic's names, India and Bharat. In the late 1990s, scholars are beginning to use those two terms to capture the growing disparity between the westernized, urban, English-speaking middle class, 'India', and the poor, illiterate or non-English classes of the small towns and villages, 'Bharat'.<sup>8</sup> Secondly, the idea of a union of states: when

you read this with the fact that new states can be formed and existing states renamed or restructured by a simple act of parliament,<sup>9</sup> the contradiction between the two is striking. 'India ... shall be a Union of States' suggests that the states existed prior to the union, but the next article establishes the precedence of the union over the states. Thus, although the structure of government is quasi-federal, India resembles Spain rather than the United States in its origins as well as in the nature of the dialogue that seems to have taken place between the union and its constituents.<sup>10</sup> India is one, constituted as such by its people, who are undistinguished in their citizenship by any primordial characteristics or affinities – so the first article of the constitution and the preamble suggest. Any differences that may arise follow the creation of the state and therefore, in their resolution, (preserving) the state in this form takes precedence. Any rights constituent groups/regions enjoy, they do so at the pleasure of the union. In one sense, this reading allows us to interpret the dialogue between the union and the regions/groups as a contest between contrasting visions of the state, where the union views itself as a potential unitary state that has chosen to 'devolve' power by re-casting itself in a federal mould, and the regions/groups see themselves as living in a federal state where the centre is bent upon assuming the powers that should be theirs.

The definition of India is also implicit in the definition of Indian. Part II of the Indian Constitution defines the terms of Indian citizenship. At the commencement of the constitution, birth, parentage and naturalization were the three determinants of citizenship. While there are special provisions for those who migrated from what became Pakistan, no other provisions mention or pertain to ethnic or regional origin. Citizenship of India is thus a legal category, conditional upon domicile rather than cultural identity. This is consistent with the India whose people, undifferentiated, constituted a union of states, where the states were created by the union. Corollaries almost of imagining Indians in this manner are the provisions that specify that Indians have no separate citizenship of the states, and that Indian citizenship must be relinquished upon becoming the citizen of another country. In a sense, this reinforces the unitary essence of the Indian state. States in India do not precede the union, they follow it. Accordingly, there is no reason to respect a prior citizenship. Separate citizenship of the federation and the federating units follows from a situation where the federating units existed before the federation and recognition of their citizenship amounts to an acknowledgement of historical reality. In this case, that is not necessary.

Nevertheless, the constitution does acknowledge that there are some differences between the people of India in its chapter on fundamental rights. It does so through the rights it sees fit to guarantee. The rights guaranteed

in this chapter fall into distinct categories: equality, liberty, religious freedom, cultural rights and the right to constitutional remedies. The provisions pertaining to equality, religious freedom and cultural rights make specific mention of the diversities that might exist among the people of India. In the provisions about cultural rights, there is mention in the marginal note of minorities. Article 29 secures the rights of groups to conserve their language, script or culture. Interestingly, the text of the provision uses the term 'section of citizens' instead of 'minorities.' This substitution was made by the drafting committee, saying that the term 'minorities' was used in a wider sense than the numerical.<sup>11</sup> In the next article, the term 'minorities' is used, granting to these minorities the right to establish and administer educational institutions. It also secures such institutions against discrimination by the state on grounds of the nature of their management. This is tempered, though, by the equality provisions that prohibit any state-aided institution from discriminating against any Indian citizen on grounds of religion, race, caste, sex, descent, place of birth, OR residence.

Take a look then at the interesting image that begins to form. The Indian state only begins to acknowledge explicitly the different identities of its citizens when it is defining the rights that they enjoy—rights that political thought traditionally sees as both emanating from the state and as defences against the state! Is this a clue to the relationship that will obtain between the state and the different groups within? Possibly. First, the Indian state, having been constituted by the people, re-constitutes itself as a union of states. It is the union that gets to choose the basis of unit demarcation – in other words, it is the union that recognizes as legitimate or even merely acknowledges the existence of a group *vis-à-vis* itself and other groups. The other instrument of such recognition is the Eighth Schedule which lists Indian languages. Groups clamour for the recognition of their language and its inclusion in this schedule, although such inclusion provides no privileges and accords no special status. It is as if they do not exist legitimately until they are so included. And then, the state seems to protect them from itself by endowing them with rights, especially those that obtain against discrimination by its agents and its institutions. How is one to read such a state's vision of itself? As mostly neutral, but capable of turning partisan and therefore, requiring safeguards against itself?

The Indian constitution includes directives to its agents and to its citizens in the next two parts. In writings on post-independence Indian politics, it is customary to depict as adversary the relationship between the directive principles of state policy and fundamental rights. This is of course, far more pertinent to socio-economic issues, but continuing the argument of the previous paragraph, there is no reason to abandon this model in thinking

about integration and diversity. Government is merely instructed to work for the creation of a uniform civil code. The state is restrained by the provisions of the chapter on fundamental rights but not actively enjoined to do anything. Ten fundamental duties are prescribed for every Indian citizen, however, and at least three of them allude to the diversity of the country (Article 51A, clauses c, e and f). Citizens must uphold the sovereignty, unity and integrity of India, promote harmony and fraternity transcending the detail of diversity and they must 'value and preserve the rich heritage of our composite culture'. This contrast seems further to substantiate the idea that the state does not regard itself as being touched in any way by the diversities that abound in Indian society. One might even say that the Indian state sees itself as reforming or modernizing a society – if only by constitutional injunction – unwilling or unable to shed its pre-modern affinities. The state seems to regard itself as largely neutral and acting upon, rather than in conjunction with, society.<sup>12</sup>

Finally, the constitution of India states that Hindi shall be the official language of the union. This is tantamount to the only touch of colour in the guise of the state! This is the only place where the state identifies with any particular identity trait. Little wonder then, that in the first 30 years of the union's existence, language was the most contentious identity issue, displaced only in the late 1970s by religious differences. To non-Hindi speakers in Tamil Nadu, this served as conclusive evidence that the Indian state was an ethnically-biased state.

The Indian insistence on ignoring the diversity of its people in the self-defining statements of the constitution is indicative of the state's anxiety about disintegration. This anxiety stems from a combination of factors. One, British and nationalist historiography of India painted pre-British (pre-modern) India as fractious and faction-ridden. Indians were constantly conquered by outsiders because they lacked unity. This lack of unity was not merely detrimental to Indian freedom, but also to those attributes of modernity that the dominant national leadership so valued.<sup>13</sup> The experience of partition had reinforced this distrust of any divisions. It was as if those who drafted the constitution feared that any concession to the existence of diversity would lead to a repetition of that experience.<sup>14</sup>

In conclusion, according to the Indian Constitution, India is a union of states, so re-constituted after its initial constitution as a unitary republic by the Indian people, which union has an official language but is, for the rest, resolutely devoid of identity markers.

### Sri Lanka

The three constitutions of independent Sri Lanka bear witness to a

transformation of the state's self-definition.

The first of the three constitutions – the Soulbury Constitution – was a product of the British. The Ceylon (Constitutional) Order in Council, 1946, to give it its proper name, was in fact, an extensive charter of governmental reform rather than a formal expression of the constitution of a state. Therefore, it began with no definition of the state – neither by the naming of the state in question, nor by the normative description of its vision. This was partly because this was not yet an independent state. The Soulbury Constitution was adopted in 1946, and Sri Lanka only became independent in 1948. The Soulbury Constitution only stepped out of its administrative mission in one instance: Article 29(2). This clause restricted the legislative power of the Ceylon Parliament, prohibiting it from interfering in religious practice and from favouring one religious or other community over another. The constitution of the First Sri Lankan Republic was only promulgated in 1972. Until then, the Soulbury Constitution continued to prevail. When one considers that this was a constitution that did not 'constitute' a state, one looks for other clues in quest of the state's vision of itself. Turning from the constitution, one might identify two definitive pieces of legislation that were passed between 1946 and 1972. The first of these was the Citizenship Act which, through the terms whereby it defined citizenship, disenfranchised a majority of the Indian Tamils who worked in the tea plantations of the central highlands. This was passed in 1948. The second was the Official Languages Act of 1956 which made Sinhala the official language of Sri Lanka. Both of these had the consequence that in practice the state became more identified with one community – the Sinhalese. They were both divisive if only in the sense of singling out one community – in the first instance, to disenfranchise them; in the second, to privilege one community over the others. With these three communities then, there evolved a hierarchy of sorts of their place within the state: the Sinhalese became identified with the state, Sri Lankan Tamils were the insider-other and the plantation/Indian Tamils were outside the system altogether.<sup>15</sup>

As characterless as the text of the Soulbury Constitution was, the 1972 constitution was rooted and evocative. The English text used begins and ends with Pali benedictions (*svasti* and *siddhirastu*), and the adoption of the constitution is dated by both the Buddhist calendar and the Gregorian calendars. The text ends with a verse in Pali describing the Buddhist ideal for the state: *devo vassatu kaalena/ sassasampatti hetu ca/ phito bhavatu loko ca/ raja bhavatu dhammiko* (May the rains fall in time/ May the harvest be bountiful/ May the people be contented/ May the king be righteous).<sup>16</sup> The stage is set for the transformation of the state that is to follow.

The people of Sri Lanka, 'being resolved in the exercise of ... freedom and independence as a nation', gave themselves a constitution in 1972. It

should be noted that they did not found the state, or constitute a particular type of state. The nation/state precedes the constitution. We are told that Ceylon, renamed Sri Lanka in this constitution, is a 'Free, Sovereign and Independent Republic'.

The second article clearly states that it is a unitary state, thus working into the constitution one of the most controversial issues surrounding the identity of the Sri Lankan state. The only place where the constitution deals with smaller units within the state is in its description of electoral districts. One tradition of Sri Lankan history holds that it has always been a unitary state.<sup>17</sup> In the early years of colonization, the British favoured a unitary structure to the colonial apparatus as a means of managing the Kandyan chiefs. A hundred years later the idea of federalism was advocated, first by S.W.R.D. Bandaranaike and then by the Tamil leadership. After 1948, the lines that were drawn between those in favour of federalism and those in favour of the unitary state grew, largely coterminous with ethnic lines. In 1972, the state entered this dialectic on the side of the unitary structure.

Article 6 gives Buddhism the 'foremost place' and it gives the Sri Lankan state responsibility for protecting and fostering Buddhism. There are two ways to look at this, and they are not necessarily antithetical. The first is through the lens of Western experience and Western thought. This lens tells us that the state is now identified with one religion and that this is somehow a bad thing. This is the progressive, secular, modernizing view and such identification is anathema to its proponents because religion is conservative, because favouring one religion over any others favours its members over other citizens and because the separation of church and state is one of the markers of the modern period in Europe. The other way to look at this is to acknowledge that it is the traditional way. The same article ends, '... while assuring to all religions the rights granted by section 18(1)(d).' In the traditional political thought of South Asia, the ruler had definite duties with regard to *dharma* or *dhamma*.<sup>18</sup> These obtained at the ethical level of being just, honest, virtuous, dutiful, but they also obtained at the level of patronage – of institutions of learning (theological and otherwise) and of places of worship. The ruler was also a performer of rituals in the interest of the state, and the giver of alms. Whether it was the Hindu or Buddhist tradition, the ruler was bound by what we now call religion. The 1972 constitution may therefore, also be placed in this tradition. The reason these are not intrinsically antithetical is that the state may foster and protect all religions equally, thus meeting the mandate of the traditional view, without compromising the egalitarianism of the modern. The problem arises when the 'foster and protect' apply to only one of the faiths of the land.

The definition of Sri Lanka's identity is thus almost a delimitation thereof. The final limit is placed by its constitutional adoption of Sinhala as

the official language. (article 7) The constitution provides for the use of Tamil in certain contexts and for translation, but Sinhala is the language of legislation and of government in general. So at the end of the first seven articles, we have a Sri Lanka that is unitary, Buddhist and Sinhala-speaking.

As with the Indian constitution, this constitution too begins with self-definition, first in terms of the 'attributes' of the state and then, in terms of the relationship between the state and its citizenry. Reading the 1972 constitution, one is struck by the 'interventionist' role that the state is enjoined to play in cultural affairs. If the Soulbury constitution's one striking feature was its explicit injunction that the state should not interfere in religious affairs, this constitution moves the state to the opposite position. The 'Principles of State Policy' in chapter V lay down the objectives of the state. Following these, the state is expected to enable the full realization of individual rights and group rights. Over and above the standard injunctions related to the protection of sovereignty and integrity, the state must strengthen 'National Unity by promoting co-operation and mutual confidence between all sections of the people of Sri Lanka including the racial, religious and other groups' (article 16(4)).

The state is first charged with 'raising' the people's moral and cultural standards (article 16(2)(f)). Under article 16(7), the state is enjoined to contribute to the development of culture and language. Finally, and the wording of this provision suggests the perspective we might prefer on this question: 'The State shall endeavour to create the necessary economic and social environment to enable people of all religious faiths to make a living reality of their religious principles' (article 16(9)). Again, like the issue of Buddhism, there are two ways one can look at this. One might question the qualifications of the state to determine, leave alone raise, moral and cultural standards. One might also balk at the judgments involved in the implicit hierarchy suggested by 'raise'. Finally, one might ask if the state should intervene in this sphere. On the other hand, when one looks at the constitution from the viewpoint of traditional South Asian political practice, a moral mandate for the state follows from several things. The term *yatha raja, tatha praja* (as the king, so the populace) sums up the relationship between morality in the highest echelons of the state and in its people. When one looks at the terms of political legitimacy, the conditions for obligation and the grounds for revolution, are all couched in terms of *dharmadhamma*. In India (and surely a related Sri Lankan tradition exists), the *rajadharma* school of political thought is distinguished by its view of politics as a process whose goal is welfare, not merely social and economic, but also moral. The importance of *rajarshis*, the value placed in historical narratives on virtuous kings and the importance of the clerical/priestly advisor, all underline the traditional linkage between these and the

creation/maintenance of socio-cultural standards and morality. In other words, this is only what 'states' have always done in this region.

Oddly, after assigning such a strong cultural component to the state's self-definition and the state's mandate, the chapter on fundamental rights is no more culturally focused than that of any other constitution. These rights include freedom of conscience and association, freedom to promote one's culture, and the right against discrimination on grounds of race, religion, caste or sex. The freedom to move around and reside anywhere in Sri Lanka is also guaranteed.

So what is Sri Lanka in the 1972 constitution? A unitary, Sinhala Buddhist state, with a strong cultural mandate amid a people who while, being occasionally Tamil-speakers, do not have rights that reflect the state's rather overstated response to their diversity. That is not to say, they have no rights, merely that their rights are commonplace compared to the strident and definitive self-definition of the state.

In some ways, the 1978 constitution of the Second Republic suggests a synthesis between the Soulbury and the 1972 constitutions. The basic definitions of state identity are consistent with 1972, but particularly after a series of amendments it moves closer to the relative inclusiveness of the Soulbury Constitution.<sup>19</sup> The use of Pali references and the Buddhist calendar are retained, but what is interesting is the elaborate – and somewhat inelegant – explanation of how the constitution came to be adopted: the people of Sri Lanka elected representatives, and they adopted the constitution as the 'Supreme Law' of the republic.<sup>20</sup> It also says that the representatives were elected to constitute Sri Lanka into a democratic socialist republic. In other words, the mandate of the representatives was to constitute a particular kind of republic and further, to adopt the law of that republic. Three things are striking about this: one, that the delegated nature of this authority is made so explicit; two, that the republic is constituted and given a law by these representatives, and that given the imperfections of the electoral process, even in ideal conditions (imperfect turnout, plurality rather than unanimity), this is not finessed away but dwelt upon.

The state is still unitary but in this constitution, the demarcation of its administrative units is done explicitly in the first chapter. The state is made up of 24 administrative districts (25 after the Seventh Amendment, 1983), and their names are listed. With the Thirteenth, Fourteenth and Fifteenth Amendments, and the introduction of provincial councils and proportional representation, the unitary nature of the state was somewhat diluted, but not the rhetoric of the unitarists.<sup>21</sup>

Buddhism retains its foremost place, but the political content of Buddhism is emphasized. It is not the theological, metaphysical doctrines of Buddhism that the state must foster and protect. This constitution is very

specific that it is 'Buddha Sasana' that must be protected. It may be argued that this is not very different from the Judaeo-Christian principles that have shaped the nature of Western democracies or the adherence to Islamic jurisprudence in other parts of the world. In the years that have passed, governments have interpreted this narrowly to justify their close relationship with the Sangha, but this does not have to follow from the article itself.

While two of the three basic features of Sri Lankan identity are somewhat the same as in 1972 – the unitary nature of the state and the pre-eminence of Buddhism – the state now has one official language and two national languages. In 1987, the Thirteenth Amendment to this constitution made Tamil the second official language of the state, with English as the link language. The state officially ceased to be monolingual. One might interpret the fact that the addition of Tamil was not made in the same sentence as Sinhala as a sign of the reluctance with which it became bilingual, but that does not alter the fact of it.<sup>22</sup>

What is almost quaint and curious is the tremendous detail in which the symbols of the state are listed and described. The national flag, anthem and day are defined, and in the case of the first two, illustrations and sheet music are introduced in a schedule of the constitution. This suggests that in defining itself the state (or rather the elected representatives who 'constituted' it) wanted to leave no detail to chance.

The chapters on rights and principles of state policy remained much the same. The state was still charged with the cultural and moral mandate that we first saw in the 1972 constitution. The national unity mandate was more specific and charges the state to 'take effective steps in the fields of teaching, education and information in order to eliminate discrimination and prejudice'(article 27(5)). But in 1978, a provision listing the fundamental duties of citizens was included for the first time. Like the mention of Buddha Sasana, they seem to come right out of the tradition of the region, including as they do the duty to work conscientiously in one's chosen profession, to respect the rights and freedoms of others and to protect nature and conserve its riches.

To summarize, Sri Lanka of the 1978 constitution is a state rooted in its Buddhist tradition of governance at least in principle, unitary even as its centralization is fraying and reluctantly bilingual. It is a state painfully conscious of its identity and piously concerned about its mandate. It is a state with a moral purpose, and it enjoins duties upon its citizenry in keeping with this self-image. The constitutional debates of today are all explained by the variations between this constitutional self-image and the reality of the respondents' visions.<sup>23</sup>

## **Pakistan**

Pakistan's constitutional history has been checkered. The first constitution of Pakistan was not adopted until 1956. Within three years, it was abrogated, and the Basic Democracies Order was instituted. The second constitution of Pakistan commenced in 1962. This was replaced in 1973 by the constitution that is currently operative, although it was suspended for a few years under martial law, and restored only after major amendments were made to it.

In essence, those provisions in which we have sought the state's definition of itself – preamble, name, statements defining internal structure, the state's relationship with religion and language issues, and the state-citizen relationship as defined by any principles of state policy and bill of rights – have changed very little through these three constitutions although provisions relating to government, personal law and law enforcement have changed dramatically. There have been changes in the operation of the political system. These areas are not pertinent, however, to our current exercise which is to identify self-defining propositions in the constitution.

In all three constitutions, the preamble reminds us that divine sovereignty is exercised in trust by the people whose will it is to establish an 'order.' The state is the product of that will, and the realization of Islamic ideals at the social and personal levels its foundation. The people who exercise this will are by implication, Muslim, and they do provide for minorities 'freely to profess and practise their religions and develop their cultures'(1973). These minorities are assumed to be religious minorities.

The first article of all three constitutions tells us the name of the republic, whether it is unitary or federal and what territories it comprises. In 1956, it was to be a federal republic called the 'Islamic Republic of Pakistan', and it comprises east and west Pakistan and territories which have acceded or may accede, territories other than those in the provinces. In 1962, it was to be called the same, but there was no mention of whether the republic was federal or not, this being the period that the state experimented with 'One Unit'. The state comprised the provinces of East and West Pakistan and other territories. In 1973, Pakistan was a federal republic once more, with the same official name, and a detailed listing of territories: four provinces (Baluchistan, NWFP, Punjab and Sind), the Islamabad Capital Territory, the federally administered tribal areas and any other territories that might accede to the state. The very first version of this constitution had a provision which read, 'The Constitution shall be appropriately amended so as to enable the people of the Province of East Pakistan, as and when foreign aggression in that Province and its effects are eliminated, to be represented in the affairs of the Federation.' That was removed in the First Amendment.

The state is called 'Islamic Republic of Pakistan.' The name remains constant through the years but the number of supporting provisions has practically tripled – including the name provision, there were seven in 1956, 15 in 1962 and almost 20 in 1973.

Looking through the constitutions, what is interesting is that of all the different kinds of diversity, religion is the one most featured. The constitution distinguishes between Muslims and non-Muslims, not so much in their rights, but in what the state is enjoined to do for them. So in one sense, the state which is willed into existence by a predominantly Muslim people, is enjoined to do certain things for the Muslims among them, while its role *vis-à-vis* others is that of a facilitator (guaranteeing their rights) and law enforcer (prohibiting forced religious taxes outside one's religion, for instance). 'Principles of Policy' in the 1973 constitution illustrate this: while the state is enjoined to assure and create conditions for the teaching and printing of the Quran, the organization of religious taxes, the maintenance of mosques and the observance of moral standards, it is expected to 'safeguard' the legitimate rights and interests of minorities. The state shall promote unity among the Muslims, but shall 'discourage parochial, racial, tribal, sectarian and provincial prejudices among the citizens' (Articles 31 and 33).

It should be pointed out that the 1973 constitution, for the first time, defines the terms 'Muslim' or 'non-Muslim.' Not part of the original text, the Second Amendment (1974) of the constitution defined who was not a Muslim. 'A person *who does not believe in the absolute and unqualified finality of the Prophethood of Muhammad (Peace be upon him) the last of the Prophets or claims to be a Prophet in any sense of the word or of any description whatsoever after Muhammad (Peace be upon him), or recognizes such a claimant as a prophet or a religious reformer, is not a Muslim for the purposes of the Constitution or law*' (italics added). That the constitution should pronounce definitively on what is essentially a theological matter is striking, but that it is a negative definition is also interesting. Very simply, it may simply be that the drafters of the amendment could not conclusively define what makes a Muslim. Those drafting the Third Amendment (1985) suffered no such inhibitions. They defined both 'Muslim' and 'non-Muslim.' The definition of Muslim is now affirmative. It is also theological (almost toggling all the provisions in the previous definition of non-Muslim), in contrast to the definition of non-Muslim: "non-Muslim" means a person who is not a Muslim and includes a person belonging to the Christian, Hindu, Sikh, Buddhist or Parsi community, a person of the Qadiani Group or the Lahori Group (who call themselves 'Ahmadis' or by any other name), or a Baha'i, and a person belonging to any of the Scheduled Castes.' There is no further definition of

who these people are. In other words, Muslims are individuals who have a set of beliefs and non-Muslims are members of specific communities. The rights enjoyed by Muslims are individual rights and the rights enjoyed by non-Muslims are group rights. Further, the duties enjoined upon the state towards Muslims are duties towards individuals and those towards non-Muslims, as we saw above, facilitating functions. Laski defined rights as 'those conditions of social life without which no man can seek, in general, to be himself at his best'.<sup>24</sup> If an individual's rights are tied largely to her group identity, then to what extent can she define herself as she deems best? What sorts of restrictions does this place on her rights as an individual?<sup>25</sup>

An interesting question that arises is what happens when the state/constitution labels a group or groups 'minorities'? What are the relationships and interactions that are automatically expected of them? How do they come to view the state and their place within it? Thinking about the notions of tolerance versus sufferance, which of these two would characterize the relationship between the minority groups and the state, and does the state then become automatically identified with the majority or does it need to have a specific identity (Malay, Sinhala, Muslim) for that to happen?

On the question of national language, the Islamic Republic of Pakistan has been less consistent. In the 1956 constitution, the state languages were to be Urdu and Bengali, with English continuing to be used in administrative contexts for some time. Provincial languages were acceptable in the place of English in the provinces. In the 1962 constitution, this changed to the extent that state languages were now designated 'national' languages, and a minor but interesting point in light of the Sri Lankan case, the order in which the languages were listed was reversed to read 'Bengali and Urdu.' The switch from 'state' to 'national' is also interesting, lending itself to an interpretation of the state's determined appropriation of 'nationhood'. But this point will merely be pointed out here, not argued. In 1973, Urdu was designated the national language of Pakistan. English would continue to be used for a short period, and provincial languages may be used and taught, in addition to Urdu. This was at the same time as all three constitutions guaranteed to any section of the citizenry having a 'distinct language, script or culture' 'the right to preserve and promote the same and ... establish institutions for that purpose' (1973, article 28).<sup>26</sup> Essentially, this was not an issue with which the state/constitution was overly concerned.

The constitution prescribes principles of state policy and rights, but again these did not change all that much. It seems that through all the dramatic political turns that the history of Pakistan has taken, its self-image has remained surprisingly constant. Not for Pakistan the agonized

redefinitions of identity that have characterised Sri Lanka. Although India does not identify with any one group, those two constitutions have in common this fundamentally unaltered basic self-definition.

So what is Pakistan according to this relative unchanging constitutional self-definition? Pakistan is an Islamic Republic, which has mostly been federal, and which is officially Urdu-speaking. There are non-Muslims and non-Urdu speakers in Pakistan, and the state guarantees their rights but is under no obligation to go out and do anything in particular for them. Its positive mandate applies largely to Muslims.

### **Integration, as Drawn from the Constitutions**

Looking at these three specific constitutional efforts, what are the ways in which these states have described the communities they enfold or represent? To recapitulate:

- India is a union of states, so re-constituted after its initial constitution as a unitary republic by the Indian people, which union has an official language but is for the rest, resolutely devoid of identity markers.
- Sri Lanka of the 1978 constitution is a state rooted in its Buddhist tradition of governance at least in principle, unitary even as its centralization is fraying and reluctantly bilingual. It is a state painfully conscious of its identity and piously concerned about its mandate.
- Pakistan is an Islamic Republic, which has mostly been federal, and which is officially Urdu-speaking. There are non-Muslims and non-Urdu speakers in Pakistan, and the state guarantees their rights but its positive mandate applies largely to Muslims.

If this is the vision each one operates with, then what are the means whereby this vision is achieved? In other words, if in each case, this might be construed as their idea of 'integration achieved', then what might be, for each of them, the process of integration?

Let us look at them one by one. In the case of India, preserving the union of states is the first priority of the integrative process. This means two things at least. First, it means that the state has to keep the territory of the union intact. This provides one of the arguments for the use of force – that the union is falling apart, shrinking, losing its resources and force must be resorted to, in order to maintain it in a certain form. Second, it means that the status of the union as prior and predominant in the union-state relationship must be maintained. This justifies centralization. It also justifies the resistance to demands for decentralization and autonomy. Integration also means the insistence on the official language, so that while the state might make (as it has) concessions to delay the establishment of

one language, there is no room for abandonment of the project. Since the state is 'resolutely devoid' of identity markers, it does not leave any space for negotiation on identity issues, so that integration is also non-negotiable. The state has a self-image, and integration is almost the 'falling in place' of the populace, to be expected because they constitute the state in the first place.

Sri Lanka is also centralized and is in fact unitary, but by virtue of its self-identification with one identity group, it has left the door open for negotiation, if unintentionally. Integration here goes hand-in-hand with the 'moral' mandate of the state. Therefore, as the state intervenes – in keeping with its mandate – in the cultural affairs of one community and then, either by omission or commission, intervenes in the cultural affairs of the other(s), it creates opportunities for demands to negotiate these terms, this mandate. When it promotes one language, it creates demands for equal status for another. If the state is identified with one group, it thereby recognizes the existence of others (in the manner in which 'some clouds bear rain' implies that others do not). Integration becomes a process of constant negotiation. The state is weakened by positioning itself on one side in the negotiation, rather than as the arbiter in the process. This means that on the one hand, while the state might need to resort to force to maintain its 'right' to be part of the negotiation, on the other, such resort is (even) less effective and (even) less defensible than in any other situation. It is less effective because it exacerbates the tension between the negotiating groups and it makes them more intransigent. It is less defensible because when the state is identified with one group, it uses force as the instrument of that group in the integrative process. Given that states (theoretically) have a monopoly on the legitimate use of force, in what position does that leave other groups? The process of integration in Sri Lanka that follows from the state's constitutional self-definition cannot be a happy one. The state must act for it is charged to do so. At the same time, it is weakened to a 'one among equals' position by its identity and given that it is not (all said and done) a state with a taste for genocide, it must fight bitterly to stem the fraying of its definition.

What does it take for the Islamic Republic of Pakistan to be integrated in its desired form? What is integration in this state? The suspension of constitutional government every now and then makes it to define integration without taking into account the impact of a coercion-based dispensation. Pakistan also has the distinction of having experienced secession in the creation of Bangladesh. Historical factors seem, since then, to have blunted the incendiary potential of a federalism that demography biases in favour of one province and of state identification with one language. Finally, the state is not entirely autonomous, given the role played in its affairs by the military

and to a lesser extent, the clerical establishments. What is integration in this process?

Like the Sri Lankan state, the Pakistani leaves the door open for negotiation on self-definition by identifying with one group. However, the unique circumstances of the establishment of the state rescue it from the prospect of Sri Lankan-style conflict. Instead, what is contested is the state's definition of who is or is not Muslim. The constitution defines the category of 'non-Muslim' in terms of the individual's membership of a community rather than the individual's beliefs. Almost automatically, the exclusion of certain groups becomes contentious. So it is not the definition of the state, but the definition of the 'official majority' within the state that is potentially contentious. The fact that the state commands so much coercive power and these groups so little seems to determine the course of this contestation as a dialogue of sustained protest and easily repressive response.

What is integration in a state like Pakistan? The inability of the state to participate autonomously in a negotiation, the demographic composition and distribution of the population and the course of history seem to have ensured a state unable to intervene, although it is capable of tremendous coercion, and individuals who have organized effectively against the suspension of the constitutional state rather than its primary definition. Is integration in a state with Pakistan's checkered history not unlike the integration of the sub-continent during the freedom movement, an accident of the political imperatives of the time?

Perhaps we can conclude this: following from the text of the constitution, integration in Pakistan might have been a negotiated consensus on power- and resource-sharing, assimilative in its advocacy of one language and partial to one religious group in the fulfilment of its *raison d'état*. In the periods when there was constitutional government, this seems to hold. In the way things have worked on the whole, integration has taken second place to other priorities: regime survival for the state and democratization for the citizenry. Any definition of integration put forth for this case solely on the basis of the constitution is, therefore, even more facile than usual.

The definition of integration that is easiest to read from the three constitutions seems to be one that describes the goal rather than lays out a process: the goal of realizing the self-image of the state. The process or procedure are largely unspecified, although other features of the constitution and the political system would provide at least the limits within which the state must operate. On the whole, integration is the goal of the state realizing its constitutional image.

### Elite Visions

Our inability to derive a definition of the process of integration from the Pakistani constitution underlines the inadequacy of constitutional and legal sources for deriving any definition at all. Often, the 'ground' realities are different from the circumstances imagined by those in the rarefied corridors of power, and particularly for the people the state seeks to integrate – the 'target audience' of the integration project.

In this instance, the communities studied were the Tamils of Tamil Nadu, India, and the Tamils of Sri Lanka.<sup>27</sup> The Tamil region in India saw India's first mass movement for social justice – the Self-Respect movement, and this movement then evolved into a linguistic nationalist and separatist movement. In 1962–63, the secessionist agenda of the movement was given up and the party that led it is a component of the coalition that came to power in 1996 at the centre. In Sri Lanka, the problem of militant separatism is current. Tamil militants continue to fight bitterly for a homeland which was demanded in 1977 after decades of policies which were perceived as victimizing, and in fact largely did victimize, the Tamils. Language and education policies were the most often-cited by respondents, although citizenship issues, relevant to the Tamils in the plantations, were also raised in this context.

The following responses are drawn from interviews that were conducted in Colombo, Sri Lanka (January–March 1996) and Madras, India (May–July 1996).<sup>28</sup> The respondents were opinion-leaders, including political analysts, journalists, other media-persons, activists, novelists, lawyers and historians. While in Sri Lanka they were from both the Sinhalese and Tamil communities, in Madras, they were almost all Tamilian. There were three core questions and then a couple of questions that varied with the case and the identity of the respondent. They were open-ended and the interviews took over an hour at times. This is a digest of answers to the first question: 'If you had to draw a word-picture of a "nationally integrated society", what would you put in that picture?' That is, what would that picture look like?

### Point of Departure

So what to these people is national integration? It was in the interviews that the distinction between national integration as a goal and a process first became sharply distinguished. Respondents would ask if they should define the goal or the process. The word-picture prejudiced the question in favour of the goal, but the respondents would veer in the direction of process before long. The goal was out there, far away, possibly unattainable, but the process

was their everyday reality. (Italics mine in the excerpts quoted below.)<sup>29</sup>

The exercise of definition began at the idea that integration was unity. What the respondents collectively teased out were the nature and conditions of that unity: 'National integration ... the very word integration is unity.' (155)

### Integration as Sentiment

For many respondents, that 'unity' or 'integration' was grounded in descriptions of what people would say, and what they would feel, and what attitudes they would display, and therefore defined more functionally ('we must *act/feel* as one') than organically ('we must *become* one'). Until recently, nationalism was always defined in this way.<sup>30</sup> Memory, loyalty, affect and will are evoked to define the state that is integration.

I don't know if you can define that at this point for perpetuity, but we sense that we have something, that there is something. This sense that comes to you very early when you start living in this country. And there is *a sense of belonging*. There is *a sense of dignity* that you question only when you realize that you are faced with so much of problems that arise because of particular factors, religions, communities, languages, so many things that divide us into the smallest segment and then *we are trying to hold it all together by one kind of a spirit* and all and so it is a little more, a difficult formative stage. We are only 50 years old and we are still trying to accept the idea and remain together not just in times of crisis, which is easier, but in times of growth. (135)

And most of all, *thinking as people or considering themselves people of one country and with a loyalty to that country*. ... So I think the principal factor that is necessary, in my vision, is for all the people whatever their backgrounds might be, *to think of themselves as belonging to and loyal to the concept of the country*, the concrete form of which is its borders. ... But the sense of belonging to a country is a concept. So if as many people as possible, in the various communities that make up this nation, can feel that fundamental feeling, then sooner or later we can consider ourselves nationally integrated. (S12)

I think you have to *accept the fact* that we are a multicultural society and have people working in harmony, accepting the cultural diversity, *not only tolerating but appreciating such a diversity*. For national unity, I think that it is important that you accept that you are from one

country. Within that you have your diversities but you agree *to appreciate* each other, *respect* each other, work on the basis of human rights. (S74)

National integration may be – in the right sense it may be – an *integrative feeling* of the people from different ... who have different culture and their language and recognizing them with their own language and culture without imposing anything. If all of us are able to join together *to have a feeling of we belong* to ... the same country or something, that would be national integration. (15)

To my mind a nationally integrated state would be where everybody is treated as an equal and everybody *feels that he belongs* to that state. ... That feeling if you can have (in?) a nation, then that certainly is an integrated nation. (S71)

An *understanding between all communities* for letting them live in a very peaceful atmosphere. It's not that you are not a Tamil, I don't want you to enjoy. And the Tamils think that the Sinhalese are killing the Tamils. Then you can't bring in integration. When you see a Sinhalese person *you must feel*, 'Okay, he is also a Sri Lankan.' We are all born and brought up in Sri Lanka. We have to live in a very peaceful atmosphere. So the understanding is the most important thing that has to come first. (S9)

One thing that occurs to me right away is that in a nationally integrated society, no one would feel insecure, no one would feel that he is not like the others, that he is not accepted fully. And also, in another sense, the people, they feel the sense of fulfilment or pride, being part of that ... that cultural identity does not prevent them from looking at all Indian people as being linked in some sense. Shared history, shared colonial experience, anti-colonial experience. Feeling of struggling for social justice today. That kind of feeling, in a society where that process has taken place and they feel that despite all their cultural distinctions, they still share a common heritage. (138)

### 'Materialist' Views

The last view foreshadows others whose view of national interest dwelt much less on the sentimental than the material. If one were to cast these views in 'ideal type' and contrast them analytically, one could say that first, they seem to replicate the idealist-materialist continuum in social science. Two, they also highlight the two sides of legitimacy: allegiance on the part of citizens and performance on the part of the state. The descriptions of

sentiment are descriptions of aspects of allegiance. Identity issues, also evocative, are decisive in determining that there will or will not be allegiance, or the extent of that allegiance. When the legitimacy of the state is defined in terms of performance, identity issues become less central than when one is simply discussing competing claims for allegiance. Such a definition reminds us that integration along identity divisions is still incomplete and the social justice imperative is just as vital to the creation of a community out of a state. Finally, considered as ideal types, the latter (the materialist) stands out for its modernist and modernising orientation. In the Indian case, where the use of cultural identity was an instrument of a movement for social justice and social reform, this is particularly important.

I would define national integration as creating a political unity based on a community of interests and I would say that the primary level at which to do this is the level of ideas and then at the level of institutions. (S26)

The challenge of social justice ... social justice is the code-word that stands for that challenge. That's very much part of national integration, in each society to integrate sections of that society in large numbers. (I40)

National integration is a sense, what I feel, that within, it needn't be a particular geographical setting but wherever the various groups and communities, *every individual, feels that he or she has equal stakes, equal share and equal everything of what that physical entity offers, then that's total integration.* If I were to explain further, each individual has his or her own identity that is shaped by language, culture, religion, personality, class, the kind of profession that you do, so that everyone is so diverse but national integration is perfect when everyone accepts ... that they have equal stakes in whatever happens in that whole area. So that is a nation. (S63)

The insistence on the material or performance dimension finds articulation in critiques of national integration, where this project is assumed to be necessarily detrimental to the larger project of social justice – or modernization. The thrust of these critiques goes beyond the limited objective of defining integration to contesting the rationale for such a project. However, if we must (and why not?) distil something for our immediate purpose, then we would derive two possible definitions by negation:<sup>31</sup> first, that the project of integration is not compatible with the social development/justice mandate of the state; second, either the project of integration must be in fact a project of social development or the project of social development must be assumed to lead to the kind of integration

favoured by the proponents of such a definition. National integration is in this view, harmful at its worst and superfluous at its most benign.

This last inference would be supported by those who see India as a success story and who attribute this success to factors outside the state sphere, particularly to the economy – the common market.

If you are talking about economy, national integration will certainly be exploiting its advantages. So things like a common market, freedom of trade, employment, flows of technology, capital, etc. – this is only one dimension of national integration. So then how does one reconcile it with ... attending to basic needs? This can all be done only at the decentralized level. So you need decentralization for certain things, you also need integration for certain things. (I56)

The materialist view of integration is however, most widely expressed by the Indian respondents, and in terms of regional development. In the state of Tamil Nadu, the 'separatist' campaign used the slogan *vadakku vazhgiradu, therkku theiygiradu* (the North flourishes, the South decays) to mobilize support. To date, integration is defined in terms of an equal sharing of resources.

As far as we can say, national integration is not only vast powers sitting in Delhi. ... That's a bad trend as far as our national integration is concerned. Equal powers, more powers to states, then; railway communication, defence, canals, should be retained by the centre. Other powers should be allocated to states. Then only the national integration will be ... see this is the position. (I24)

The reason we did not worry too much about it earlier, was that in the first 15–20 years after independence, there were five-year plans. There was Mahalanobis. There was Nehru, who was a Prime Minister beloved to all of India. The Congress Party was an all-India party. No matter what they did, the people had this confidence that it was the party that had fought for freedom, and that they would only do that which was for the good of the people. Also, because of the plans, in all the regions we actually saw before our eyes Manimuttara Dam, Bhakra Nangal Dam, the Sindri fertilizer plant, they came up one by one. Because of the plan. In the first three five-year plans, labour-intensive projects, capital-intensive projects, *anicuts* [dams] came up before our eyes. Then through the Government of India, Tamil Nadu got all these. Venkataraman was here, Kamaraj was influential. People were happy – there is a road being built here, our town is getting a school, our place is getting a college. Even though the same unitary

system existed then and the same kind of government, this was the reason we did not notice then. We got no facilities in the days of the *vellaikaaran*, and now we did, and we had a voice.<sup>32</sup> (I75)

What is interesting is that those who define national integration in these terms are also critical of the project of creating a community that is identity-based. They seem to regard it almost as a diversionary tactic by the groups that dominate the state. Perhaps one can interpret the constitutional comparison of the previous section in light of this. It would seem that the Indian constitution's ignoring identity markers is reflective of such an outlook and also that this would explain the relative 'success' of the Indian state at the goal of integration. Purely relative to the other two cases, that is, and purely from the perspective of the case considered within India.

These two views are not dichotomous and mutually exclusive. If one takes them both into account, then one might come up with the following definition: *integration is the process of coming together, in attitude, memory and interest, which derives from and contributes to the development of the 'constituents.'*

### Identifying the Constituents

The next question is: *who* must be united? What are these constituents? The referent objects were variously described: nations, states, groups, classes, individuals with particular traits. What is interesting is that the categories picked were reflective of contemporary crises. In India, although the research was oriented towards the issue of linguistic identity, outside Madras people usually spoke to the question of religious identity, and in Madras it was more a regional or caste identity than linguistic, because language and religion are conflated in their parlance. In Sri Lanka, it was linguistic identity (what they call ethnic identity) rather than religious, except when referring to the Moors or Muslims of Sri Lanka, who define themselves that way. Compare this to their respective constitutions. The Indian constitution looks determinedly away, and the Sri Lankan identifies with one intersecting linguistic and religious group. In the case of the former, there has been some constitutional resolution to the linguistic question and there is a constitutional position on the religious, although the controversy is partially one of interpretation. In the latter, the constitution validates the boundaries of the ethnic group and so it is easy to use that as the 'natural' constitutive unit.

As the term national integration implies that there are different *groups*, and that they are integrated ... I personally feel that by national integration you are speaking about people coming together

... people, cultural or nationality or whatever, coming together in peace within one state. (S26)

National integration is the unification of the *entire states of India*. (I22)

National integration is the coming together of those who would say, 'I am Indian, I am Tamilian, I am Muslim, I am Hindu, I am from Haryana.' ... We are all Indians. (I20)

A family of *nations* are integrated into one nation, that is called national integration. (I2)

So if *as many people as possible, in the various communities* that make up this nation, can feel that fundamental feeling, then sooner or later we can consider ourselves nationally integrated. (S12)

And what I understand by national integration. ... *All peoples of all races and all religions* can live peacefully, and that had been achieved in many periods in our country's history and specially in the last pre-colonial kingdom, the Kandyan kingdom. It is often stated, and there is concrete evidence, that *people of all nationalities* lived together peacefully because we have evidence not only Sri Lankan, the evidence of indigenous people, but evidence of foreigners that there were, the king had in his employ Hindus, Muslims, Europeans, Christians, both Protestants and Roman Catholics, lived very peacefully in the Kandyan kingdom. (S32)

Those who view integration through the lens of social development, would add apart from the categories mentioned here, those of underprivileged classes and castes and women. (See I78, I40 above.) When one fills the actors into the definition derived earlier, one might say that *integration is the process of coming together, in attitude, memory and interest, which derives from and contributes to the development of the constitutive individuals, groups (identity or interest) and units.*

### The Project Executors

Who bears the responsibility for integrating these 'units'? For the most part, the respondents did not nominate a single agent in so many words. They discussed the historical role of various agents – governmental, individual and organizational of one kind or another.

The state or government was the agent most often discussed, and mostly indirectly in their definition of what would constitute/create/characterize an

integrated society. Many of the features named were state-related. One might ask whether it is because this is the agent that the respondents most favoured or because the project of national integration so bears the impress of the state that it seems first of all to be a project about the state. It could also be that the cues that the respondents received, whether the phrasing used at a particular time or even in the project description that preceded the interview, predisposed them to a state-centric view. Most likely though, it is the nature of the societies to which they belong, and the state's dominating presence in these societies – in its traditional and contemporary roles.

Nationally integrated state should build up its character with a lot of confidence. Confidence-building among the races is the most vital thing. (S69)

To my mind a nationally integrated state would be where everybody is treated as an equal and everybody feels that he belongs to that state. Now that can be done partly by a political state, partly by the education of the individual to look upon the country as his own. (S71)

S71 mentions education, but in all the three states considered in this study, the education system is a part of the state structure, doubling the responsibility of the state for integration and the socialization needed for this process. Some respondents in India pointed out that the civil service has contributed significantly to integration. Each year, new recruits are appointed to particular state cadres, taking care that half of the appointments to each state cadre should be outsiders to the state, and half insiders.

For example a villager in a remote Thanjavur village, he transacts business not only with a Tamilian but also with a Northerner ... Lots of outsiders come in ... they bring new ideas, new cultural values, and they learn the local language, try to speak the language and all that. That kind of interaction takes place. This is one guarantee against any kind of divisive force. People have started accepting individuals outside the state in ruling the district and all. So this is a development which has definitely contributed. No doubt about this. All-India Services have played a definite role in promoting national integration. And every indication is that it will grow and not weaken. (150)

Indian respondents saw their country as having largely been not unsuccessful at achieving integration. The double negation is used deliberately, because many of the respondents would hesitate to concede the affirmative outright! Most Sri Lankans also cited India as an example of successful integration,<sup>33</sup> and they attributed it, by and large, to state structure. So how would one sum up the question of agency?

It is something that has to be a kind of bottom-up as well as a top-down process, in the sense of you can't do it by just a mass movement or kind of societal consciousness alone. It has to be registered in terms of either a parliament or a government taking the lead at some point to be able to say, 'Look, this is what the agenda is at the present moment and this is how we can satisfactorily resolve it.' There can't be one without the other. I see that as a complementary process. You can't have one without the other because then, of course, you're going to lead to greater tension. You can't force this idea on people. On the other hand, you can't have a great big popular movement for it, to which the power élite, the decision-making élite in this country is quite impervious. Alternatively, if the decision-making élite is inherently resistant to it, you're going to end up with a whole lot of tension. ...

[*When there is no great popular discussion of national integration, would it still be incumbent upon the state to initiate this?*] Yes, I think it is incumbent in the sense that the personnel of the state are put in that position to lead. But it is a question of how they articulate and how they go out to disseminate these ideas. It has to be voluntary. They have to persuade and they have to convince and carry people with them. But there is one other segment or one other agency – if we can call it that – that has a role to play and that is, within civil society, the intelligentsia, who again, have a duty to perform in terms of providing a critique of society and out of that critique, highlighting, identifying future threats, promises, challenges, etc. They have an ongoing duty if you like to be able to show, chart the progress or chart the evolution of society and to identify things – which, after all, at various times, politicians by very nature cannot articulate and which the masses too will not be able to identify. They have to provide that kind of bridge. That's a very special function that they have to perform. And civil society groups. In this whole process, one should not rely entirely upon the mass or entirely upon the state. There are mediating groups in civil society ... in terms, when you're talking in terms of tolerance, when you're talking in terms of democratic spaces, etc., civil society has a key role to play, as well. (S47)

*Integration is a process of coming together, in attitude, memory and interest, which derives from and contributes to the development of the constitutive individuals, groups (identity or interest) and units, for which the state bears primary, though not sole, responsibility.*

### Putting the Constituents in their 'Places'

What are the terms and conditions of this integration? This is actually the point at which the state and the individual have to 'put their money where their mouths are', to use a rather vulgar idiom from the world of wheeling and dealing. This is the point at which the definition really comes to life. What one says here is what one has to live with, and therefore, the political position and the identity of the respondent determined the response in both Sri Lanka and in India. What in fact were respondents' preferences for how the constituents should relate to each other and to the collective?

Given that the respondents spoke from their personal experiences and standpoints, there was obviously no one theme or one way that they preferred to be integrated. In the pages that follow, representative themes will be summarized and reported.

#### *Integration is unity in diversity*

This is the Indian formula for national integration, and Indian respondents trotted it out without deconstruction or qualification. It was as if, having stated this, they met their definitional requirement, and could then talk about what interested them, narrate anecdotes or highlight issues that were important to them. This term is commonly associated with Jawaharlal Nehru though there is no reason to think that he coined the phrase.

She was like some ancient palimpsest on which layer upon layer of thought and reverie had been inscribed, and yet no succeeding layer had completely hidden or erased what had been written previously. All of these existed together in our conscious or subconscious selves, though we might not be aware of them, and they had gone to build up the complex and mysterious personality of India. That sphinxlike face with its elusive and sometimes mocking smile was to be seen throughout the length and breadth of the land. *Though outwardly there was diversity and infinite variety among our people, everywhere there was that tremendous impress of oneness, which had held all of us together for ages past, whatever political fate or misfortune had befallen us. The unity of India was no longer merely an intellectual conception for me: it was an emotional experience which overpowered me. That essential unity had been so powerful that no political division, no disaster or catastrophe had been able to overcome it.*<sup>34</sup> (italics added.)

India, which has been described by Pandit Nehru as 'unity in diversity' as a matter of fact has varied cultures, varied languages. The people who belong to different cultures, who speak different

languages, who live in different terrain, rural areas down to the sea-plains, who live in the riverside ... people have to differ in their cultures and their languages. India has so many languages, 24–25 languages and so many different dialects. Therefore, to talk for the Indians in terms of national integration is very, very important. And it's a question that everybody has to analyse. ... And to me, national integration is that how do these people who belong to varied situations and still live in a country – this is what Pandit Nehru brought up. Pandit Nehru who said 'unity in diversity.' (118)

What is my country? You have such questions. When you start realizing what is country, and what is unity in diversity. What does India mean and what does *saare jahan se achchha*<sup>34</sup> ... then you feel there is something, something immutable, that you have to ... whatever comes, whatever be there, that I am for my nation. It automatically comes. (166)

National integration ... the very word integration is unity. There might have been diversities. Diversity, in taste and preferences, but unity, that is something which we exercise. Which we have to exercise with mutual respect. (155)

The difference is that even if India has the same kind of diversity, Hinduism underpins that, unifying all of us. Those who live in Kashmir do not know Tamil, but they need to come to Rameswaram for *moksha*. For those who live in Rameswaram, *moksha* can only be obtained in Kashi. Now, the people, our Tamilian, in Rameswaram don't know Hindi. {somehow they manage to communicate} Fifty to hundred years [ago], people used to go in bullock-carts. They used to say that if ten people went in a bullock-cart, only the bullock would return. [The others would settle on the way] ... To date, the thing that keeps us together is this thread, India's Hindu culture. ... The other thing that keeps us together is that during the freedom struggle we set aside our linguistic and other differences and got together.<sup>36</sup> (172)

Sri Lankans also alluded to this:

If national integration means unity within a framework that accepts diversity, and allows different sections to have self-expression, then I think it's a very desirable thing. (S85)

But the diversity debate in Sri Lanka is: is it conceivable to think of a united Sri Lanka, in which there can be one state, maybe many nations? A united Sri Lanka is one in which there is one government, or one government at the central level and many governments at the

local level. But fundamentally it means a form of ethnic coexistence where ... you create policy, structure and institutions, where you minimise the propensity for rivalry. (S33)

The idea of 'unity in diversity' is interesting for two reasons. First, the diversity referred to is always cultural. There is no mention of the kinds of diversity that contemporary multiculturalists would include – class and gender for instance. Second, it is assumed that the unity that emerges is somewhat instinctive. Factors that promote unity are facilitators or catalysts rather than starters or causes. Looking at the words quoted above, if one were to identify the 'doer', the agent or promoter of national integration, one would find not human agency but the agency of forces that are larger than life – history, the values of a civilization. So for those who adopt this view, unity and diversity are given. You either have them or you don't!

*Integration is unity with individuality*

Here the notion of diversity is replaced by individuality. This is more flexible and more accommodative. It is more flexible because it may apply to individuals at any level of analysis – a person, a group, a region. It is more accommodative because it suggests that the key to their self-definition lies with the individual constituent who might even choose more than one identity or allegiance.

I think integration is unity without losing your individuality. (I28)

I would like to describe national integration as a system or as a phenomenon that will allow you to retain your cultural identity, your linguistic identity. At the same time, work for a common goal, for a common polity which can take this large mass of people into the next millennium. So if we speak many languages and we follow many cultures and we follow different religions. (I34)

Only that national integration will fructify that gives room to regional identity. (I46)

In my opinion, national integration to be understood to a certain extent without losing identity. Without losing one's own identity. Without losing one's own identity a person must be brought in into the democratic framework of a particular nation. ... So for the next century in my opinion, national integration means to what extent society or polity, the political set-up of that particular country, is prepared to tolerate, tolerate your own identity. That tolerance would definitely build up, build up a new democratic society in which this national integration would become possible. (S81)

Though integration, the way I would see it, would be a separateness, but a sharing. A sharing of resources, power ... the usual clichés, but I would insist that in my conception of integration, that is, that which is common in terms of identity and so on is minimal. It would be coexistence with power-sharing but the right for separate identities. But not necessarily, I am not talking about idiosyncratic and individualistic kind of things. (S4)

So integration, for me, is giving up your individuality. Don't lose your identity; at the same time, try to interact, whether it is a family or within my state or inter-state or international level. (I70)

*Integration is not assimilation*

I am not for assimilation; if national integration means assimilation of groups into the society, that, I think is not a very healthy development. (S85)

If we are thinking about integration as a positive aspect, then I'm certainly not talking about assimilation. Assimilation, in a multi-ethnic situation, can lead to not to the creation of a new identity but the subsuming of one identity by another hegemonic identity. So assimilation is certainly not what I would be talking about. (S29)

I think the one prerequisite, or the most important I would consider for national integration is absence of discrimination. I feel that discrimination leads to a lot of problems. If you identify discrimination, a stage of discrimination would be oppression and exploitation. ... Within that process or within the changing cases you would find militancy and terrorism and assimilation. So I would call a sense of discrimination: both political level and societal level. (S60)

[In the] United States there has been a strong sense of national identity, but that is not a satisfactory model for us because that is integration which is achieved through assimilation and that's not what we should or can.. It seems to work ... but it was never complete because it did not absorb the blacks. And now there are Hispanics. (S51)

None of the Indians used the word 'assimilation' in their response. This is possibly because assimilation has not really been a part of the Indian experience, at least in the sense of smaller identities being entirely absorbed in larger. This is the only sense in which the Sri Lankan critics of assimilative integration define the term.

*Integration is assimilation*

Advocates of an assimilative vision call on history to buttress their claims.

You can remove the wall today but can you bring nearer together? ... But the Sri Lankans, if they are to survive without warfare and brutal attacks overnight into other man's territory, must get the idea of a Sri Lankan community. Because land is there, the mobility is there, social and cultural, go around and look at our temples. Right from the twelfth, thirteenth centuries, that's nearly seven to eight hundred years ago, Polonnaruwa will have in the court itself three or four *devalas*, that is places of worship for Hindu gods, because there were queens got down from India as the wives of the kings here. We didn't set them out. ... Religio-cultural assimilation came into our country. Living together peacefully. Even now, there is this question of assimilating not crushing the foreign in our country. Even Skanda the well-known god of war, who is now in Sri Lanka, he is now in the Buddhist pantheon. ... Cultural assimilation ... was a part of Buddhism. (S84)

National integration in this part of the world I think is a post-colonial problem, because prior to the colonialism, let's say in Sri Lanka, there was no question of national integration as such because people who came from abroad, maybe from South India, maybe from Malaysia, maybe from China, maybe from Arab ... they were assimilated into the Sinhala society. In fact, even during the fourteenth, fifteenth and sixteenth centuries, there are records of people migrating from Kerala, Malabar coast, especially to this part of the country, that is the western coastal lines, and have been assimilated into the Sinhala society and within a generation or two, or maybe at most three, they became Sinhalese. And also ... so there was no question of integration as such ... it is a case of assimilation into the existing society. In India also, there is no question of national integration as such because there were various kingdoms and in those kingdoms people were just one entity, one homogenous entity. (S41)

Assimilation is used to mean acceptance or inclusion here, rather than absorption. The contrast between opponents' and advocates' interpretations of the word 'assimilation' seem to be part of the problem with the debates on the ethnic conflict in Sri Lanka. The opponents come typically from the liberal, left-wing, academic elite and the advocates from what is considered the conservative 'Sinhala' right wing. When the former hear the latter use the term, they hear 'absorption,' 'subsuming minority cultures into a hegemonic majority culture,' 'hegemony' and domination. What the

advocates mean is not so much such 'blanket' absorption that other cultures vanish, as the kind of give-and-take that has characterized civilizations over longer historical periods. The problem with the advocates is not so much their advocacy of assimilation as the fact that it is part of a larger discourse that is sometimes discriminatory or exclusionary. Again, their idea of assimilation seems not very different from the idea of synthesis or syncretism.

*Integration is synthesis*

The way I look at it is not as an assimilative sort of ... but I would say it is simply a method of constructing some kind of over-arching identity that would incorporate. ... (S58)

I would understand political integration as nothing but the creation of a common political identity. (S11)

National integration would mean really the merging of separate identities into a common phenomenon manifesting itself in calling everybody living in the country as citizens, of that vision or name by which the country is called. In the case of Sri Lanka, I dare say that that deep vision doesn't exist. (S79)

I think probably, I would say, a common cultural pattern, culture in a very deep sense, a common cultural pattern, isn't that what integrates? A common cultural pattern that has evolved over the years to accommodate all the sub-cultures and where all different groups find some commonness. This is what I think. Because basically, if there is no common cultural pattern, I don't think you can have national integration. It is impossible because you can have a kind of federal state or whatever it is ... for convenience. A federal state is for convenience, for one's own protection, where groups come together as a kind of level, higher up. Like in India, where each state comes together for a common view, common features, economic system, this and that. That may be possible. But for real integration, there is no real integration in that sense. It's a kind of mechanical kind of ... and ... at a government level. But real integration, I think it is possible with a common cultural heritage. I think that is the most important thing. If there is a common cultural heritage, then it is possible for different ethnic groups to get together and work together. And that is why I think it is possible in this country because I do think this may be a multi-ethnic, multi-religious society ... I don't know in what sense you can call this ... where 75 per cent of the population are Sinhalese ... but let's assume ... but what I am saying is whatever we call it, here I

find that this may be a multi-ethnic, multi-religious in that sense, but it's not a multicultural society. Because over the years, thousands of years, we have evolved a culture which the Buddhists, the Hindus, the Tamils and Sinhalese can share in. (S14)

Synthesis in these definitions seems to describe a state of affairs where individuals and groups have their own identity, and somewhere above or apart from these there is the identity of the state, an identity that they share. The sharing seems to evolve rather than be imposed or fostered. In that sense, this may be a long-term perspective (where long-term is at least a couple of hundred years).

### **Integration from the Perspective of the Respondents**

*Integration is a process of coming together, in attitude, memory and interest, which derives from and contributes to the development of the constitutive individuals, groups (identity or interest) and units, for which the state bears primary, though not sole, responsibility, and which may entail a variety of relationships between the constituents themselves and between the constituents and the collective.*

### **Defining Integration**

The penultimate part of this paper identifies and discusses some of the issues that seem, from the social science literature, the constitutions and the responses, to be central to the consideration of national integration. First, a review of the definitions derived in the last three sections:

- Integration is a process whereby the co-operation of the several creates, over a period of time, a more or less singular entity, whose creation facilitates action and change, and in which the several repose their allegiance to a greater or lesser degree.
- Integration is the goal of the state realizing its constitutional image.
- Integration is a process of coming together, in attitude, memory and interest, which derives from and contributes to the development of the constitutive individuals, groups (identity or interest) and units, for which the state bears primary, though not sole, responsibility, and which may entail a variety of relationships between the constituents themselves and between the constituents and the collective.

Several of the respondents, particularly in Sri Lanka where the responses were more analytical, differentiated between integration through synthesis and through assimilation. Another difference that we see in the three cases

is the degree to which the state intervened in the process of integration. If the state's self-definition affects the prospects for national integration, then what works better – the identity-blind approach or the identity-based approach? The role of force haunts any question of politics, and will be raised, leading us also to ask if there are limits to the desirability of this goal.

### *National integration is both a goal and a process*

As a goal, it embodies the vision of the state as inherited by the state's makers and it reflects some conversation between that vision and the socialization and memories of the citizens. In defining national integration as a goal, one recounts the features of the desired state of affairs, the conditions for their coming into existence and the conditions for their continuance. One also considers the benefits that one expects from that state.

Reconstructing from the interview descriptions, in light of the other two sources, one might say that in wanting national integration, one wants a political setting in which groups have rights, and are able to co-operate on common concerns. This is facilitated by legal-constitutional structures. In such a setting, the state is able to deliver more equitably on its welfare mandate, undisturbed by violent disputes. Such a setting is characterized by minimal state intervention, ensured by decentralization in government and a participatory politics based on an active civil society.

As a process, national integration is essentially community-building. Building a community involves building a consensus on what constitute the common concerns within a polity, on what constitute the agreed limits wherein they may be pursued, and on the place of different groups within that polity. Over and above that, however, national integration appears to involve a process of replicating the features of kinship, ethnicity or faith-based allegiance with the state as referent. It therefore, involves consensus-building also on what the common history of the state's constituents is, what the state's symbols are and what the identity of the state is, in those terms.

Writing on integration in the 1950s and early 1960s was focused on Europe and soon became a part of the European politics literature. The area of political development or nation-building was passed over soon enough by other concerns and research interests. Today, discussions of nationalism and national identity are essentially about non-state actors and their aspiration to statehood. The idea of building a political community out of a state is left out in the cold, even as interest in multiculturalism and diversity issues mounts in the developed world. The contrasts in this research between the old theoretical literature, state ideals and élite visions suggest that the time is ripe for re-defining not just how advanced industrial

societies which are host to immigrant nationality groups should adjust, but also how relatively new and internally diverse polities should regard and reconcile the diversities within their jurisdiction.

## NOTES

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1. David Mitrany, *A working peace system; an argument for the functional development of international organization* (London: National Peace Council, 1946); Leon N. Lindberg, *The Political Dynamics of European Integration* (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 1963); Leon N. Lindberg and Stuart A. Scheingold (eds), *Regional Integration: Theory and Research* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1971).
2. Ernst B. Haas, *The Uniting of Europe* (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 1958); Johann Galtung, 'A Structural Theory of Integration,' *Journal of Peace Research*, Vol.5, No.4 (1968).
3. Karl W. Deutsch, *Nationalism and Social Communication*, 2nd edition (Cambridge, MA: M.I.T. Press, 1966); Karl W. Deutsch et al., *Political Community and the North Atlantic Area* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1957); Philip E. Jacob and James V. Toscano, *The Integration of Political Communities* (Philadelphia, PA and New York: Preceptor, J.B.Lippincott Company, 1964)
4. Binder et al., *Crisis and Sequences in Political Development* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1971); Charles Tilly (ed.), *The Formation of National States in Western Europe* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1975); Stein Rokkan, 'Models and Methods in the Comparative Study of Nation-building,' *Acta Sociologica*, Vol.12, No.53 (1969), p.73; Myron Weiner, 'Political Integration and Political Development,' *Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science*, Vol.358 (1965), pp.52-64; Clifford Geertz, 'The Integrative Revolution: Primordial Sentiments and Civil Politics in the New States,' in Geertz (ed.), *Old Societies and New Nations* (New York: Free Press of Glencoe, 1963).
5. Robert Axelrod, *The Evolution of Cooperation* (New York: Basic Books, 1984); Kenneth A. Oye (ed.), *Cooperation under Anarchy* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1986).
6. The influence of political thinkers on those who framed these constitutions is, however, well known. The first generation of post-colonial leadership which was educated in the metropole was familiar with the works of Laski, Marx, Mill, Bentham and the Webbs.
7. Socialism is less relevant here than secularism because communities are defined also by religious affinity, and the politics of identity in India centres today around the place of various religiously defined communities vis-à-vis the state.
8. Bhabani Sen Gupta, conversation, Urbana, May 1994. This is however, usually attributed to Rajni Kothari.
9. Constitution of India, article 2. A fuller discussion is to be found in Swarna Rajagopalan, 'National Integration: The State in Search of Community', dissertation in progress, University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign.
10. Jeanie J. Bukowski, 'Decentralization in Spain: A Re-examination of Causal Factors', unpublished dissertation, 1997, University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign.
11. Clauses 23, Draft Constitution and Constituent Assembly Debates, Vol.7: 922-3, cited in *The Framing of India's Constitution*, Vol. 3 (New Delhi: Indian Institute of Public Administration, 1966) pp.525-6; The Constituent Assembly Debates (CAD) are also accessible at the Indian Parliament home page (<http://alfa.nic.in/debates/vol7pm.htm>).
12. This is true particularly where it relates to caste which, although not the subject under discussion here, is a very important issue in Indian political discourse.

13. Alberuni's account of India captured this relationship convincingly. He described Indians as disunited and inward-looking. These were antithetical to the spirit of reason and discovery, and hence Indians were mired in superstition and custom. See Edward C. Sachan (ed. and trans.), (Delhi: Low Price Publications, 1989).
14. Several historians say this and it is fairly explicit in the CAD as well.
15. The separation between the two Tamil communities is such that their politics are different, and in the post-ethnic crisis focus on Sri Lankan politics, the plantation Tamil community is virtually ignored, except by a few Sri Lankan scholars (Vani Kanapathipillai and Sunil Bastian, for example).
16. Translated by Lorna Dewaraja, interview, Colombo, 19 February 1996.
17. Swarna Rajagopalan, 'A Traveller's Collection of Tales', *Nethra*, International Centre for Ethnic Studies, Colombo, Vol.1, No.4 (1997), p.25.
18. The Sanskrit and Pali forms of a word that stands at the core of Hindu and Buddhist world-views, but which is hard to translate into English. In the context of the state, Romila Thapar defines it in her book on Asoka as a 'policy of social responsibility.' It is more conventionally translated as 'righteousness', and is sometimes used to denote 'duty' and sometimes to denote 'religion', as there is no word for the latter in these languages. Romila Thapar, *Asoka and the Decline of the Mauryas* (New Delhi: Oxford India, 1963), p.3.
19. To what extent do inclusiveness and non-intervention (and conversely, exclusiveness and intervention) go hand-in-hand? If they are directly related, does this mean that the state can only intervene as an 'ethnically'-defined state?
20. There is a truism among students of Indian history that as the power of the ruler ebbs, his/her titles become more grandiose and pretentious. There is a suggestion of this quality to the 1978 Sri Lankan constitution.
21. The demarcation of units and the debates surrounding that are the subject of the next section.
22. The first line of Article 22 remains that designating to Sinhala the status of official language. A second clause has been inserted stating that Tamil shall also enjoy this status. This is sometimes interpreted as a grudging concession.
23. This contradiction in turn, reflects something that one sees at many levels and in many locations: an alienation between those whose political culture is informed more by Western principles and ideals and those whose political culture is more 'home-spun.' The danger with such a reading is that it essentializes and often is used to valorize one (the home-spun) of these orientations over the other (the Western). It is true that until recently, it was Western notions that were favoured in academic writing; nevertheless, there seems to be no need to replicate that bias. Does decolonization only occur after such a reaction has spent itself and found a *via media*?
24. Harold J. Laski, *A Grammar of Politics* (London: George Allen & Unwin, 1960), p.91.
25. One restriction it definitely does place is that she (or even he) cannot be president of Pakistan if she is a non-Muslim. This is consistent through all three constitutions.
26. Article 19 in 1956; article 18 in 1962.
27. In the case of Sri Lanka, it was hard to separate the problem into a pure dyadic, state-versus-group conflict, and therefore my research encompassed the visions of both major communities on the island.
28. I was unable to travel to Pakistan.
29. Excerpts are reported here, with very little editing.
30. Renan defined 'nation' as, 'a soul, a spiritual principle'. Ernest Renan, *Qu'est-ce qu'une nation?* trans. Ida Mae Snyder (Paris: Calmann-Levy, 1882), p.26, cited in John Hutchinson and Anthony D. Smith (eds), *Nationalism* (Oxford Readers, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1994), p.17.
31. In Indian logic, this is a valid form of inference. It is also considered in some schools as a corollary of any affirmative definition.
32. Mahalanobis: economist and architect of the heavy industries development model that India adopted. R. Venkataraman: senior Congress politician and a Tamilian, he held important economic portfolios through his career which culminated in his election as the President of India. K. Kamaraj: senior Congress politician from Tamil Nadu, very influential in the years immediately following the death of Nehru and in the election of Indira Gandhi to the prime

ministership *Vellaikkaaran* (Tamil): white man. The first five-year plan focused on the agricultural sector, the second on the heavy industries and infrastructural sector and the third in attaining many of the goals of the first two plan periods. Drought and war interrupted the plan process which was then resumed with the fourth plan, during which period investment in the agricultural sector yielded the dividends of the 'green revolution'.

33. Other states that appeared as role models were Switzerland, Singapore, Malaysia and Canada. Neither the US nor the former Soviet Union were contenders, the US being often cited as having failed to integrate its African-American population.
34. Jawaharlal Nehru, *The Discovery of India* (New York: Anchor, 1959), p.27.
35. *Saare jahaan se achchha, Hindustan hamara* (Urdu) Better than the whole world, is our Hindustan (India). This is the first line of a patriotic song from the independence movement written by Muhammad Iqbal.
36. Rameswaram: Hindu temple town near the southern tip of India; Kashi: Hinduism's most sacred city, located in the Gangetic plain. (Same as Banaras or Varanasi).

## The Housing Policies for Ethiopian Immigrants in Israel: Spatial Segregation, Economic Feasibility and Political Acceptability

FRED A. LAZIN

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This paper studies the housing absorption policies of the Israeli government for almost 50,000 Black Ethiopian Jews who immigrated since the early 1980s. The objective is to explain why particular policies were adopted and why the Ethiopians were treated so differently. Why did so many Ethiopians find themselves in spatially segregated housing in the periphery despite official policies to the contrary?

One explanation is provided by Holt (1995) who argues that the spatial segregation of housing for Ethiopians was inevitable; policies mattered little. It is argued here that policies did matter – it was government policy that directed Ethiopians to specific communities and locations – but the key to understanding why the particular policies were adopted lies with the concepts of political acceptability and feasibility (economic and political).

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*In response to a question about policies to absorb the recent influx of Soviet and Ethiopian immigrants (1989–92), a former Israeli Prime Minister responded: 'There was no policy. ... Immigration itself creates solutions ... and solves problems' To the same question, a senior Jewish Agency absorption official commented: 'At the university you have ideas of vast plans ... in life we do not have the time needed to make one. ... There is a need for quick and immediate decisions.'*

### Introduction

Israeli governments since independence have pursued the goal of providing every Jewish immigrant a 'decent home in a suitable living environment'.<sup>1</sup> The government contracted for or built two-thirds of all new housing units until 1967; thereafter, it supplied about one-third and offered immigrants subsidized mortgages to purchase housing in the private market. By the

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